Armenian Intelligence Agency on Potential Large-Scale Azerbaijani Attack

The National Security Service of Armenia has published its annual report on the external risks facing Armenia for the year 2025.

It is highly likely that in 2025, the bilateral formats for negotiations on various issues between Armenia and Azerbaijan will continue to remain the most effective of those attempted by the parties thus far. Based on the analysis of various facts, information, and phenomena, the likelihood of a large-scale military attack by Azerbaijan against Armenia is not assessed as high at the moment of this report's publication.

At the same time, in the absence of a contractual peace and diplomatic relations, the risk of local tensions and escalation at the border will continue to be part of Azerbaijan's policy tools for threatening the use of force against Armenia. This risk could be somewhat mitigated by the smooth continuation of the delimitation and demarcation process that commenced in 2024, according to the mutually agreed procedures.

The absence of contractual peace and diplomatic relations between Armenia and Azerbaijan creates a real risk of maintaining tense interstate relations, which could deepen further under the influence of regional alliance realignments or transformations of historical alliance relations.

The risks of maintaining tense interstate relations are also increased by Azerbaijan's official/aggressive rhetoric, attempts to interfere in Armenia's internal affairs, and steps taken by Azerbaijan to impose its unilateral demands in the negotiation process through the introduction of various artificial topics. The likelihood of continuing to employ such tools in 2025 remains high.

In 2025, Azerbaijan will continue to accelerate the development of its offensive capabilities, reducing the timeframe from high-level political decision-making for transitioning to military action to the initiation of combat operations on the ground. In this context, Azerbaijan will continue to work on the transition of more mobile units, the preparation of reserves, the acquisition and import of new armaments, and the upgrading of military infrastructure.

The viability of military blocks will continue to remain in a challenge mode. In this regard, despite the founding arrangements, the ineffectiveness of the CSTO in responding to issues that fall under its statutory objectives in the South Caucasus is unlikely to change in 2025.

We assess it as unlikely that the grounds for suspending Armenia's CSTO membership will be resolved in 2025, which in our assessment means that the authority of this security structure will continue to be significantly questioned and a source of concern for other member states.