Why the Armenia-Azerbaijan Peace Treaty Concerns Iran

Last month, as protests spread throughout Iran, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was focused on another, less obvious threat to the regime: a potential peace treaty between Azerbaijan and Armenia. This was highlighted in a comprehensive article by Serbian political analyst Nikola Miković published in Euractive, who primarily centers on the foreign policies of Russia, Belarus, and Ukraine, with special attention to energy and "pipeline politics," as reported by Tert.am.

The author reminds readers that during large-scale military exercises, the IRGC utilized pontoon bridges for the first time to cross the Aras River, which separates Iran from Azerbaijan and Armenia. The demonstration of military force, officially termed as regular drills, served as a symbolic message to Baku that Tehran will not accept changes in this border region.

But why is Iran so concerned that a possible peace treaty between two bitter enemies could lead to such outcomes? And how could these changes challenge Iran's authority? This question is posed by the analyst.

He recalls that the ceasefire declaration brokered by Russia in 2020 noted that Armenia agreed to construct transportation links between Western Azerbaijan and the Nakhchivan exclave. This provision was intended to ensure unimpeded movement of citizens, vehicles, and goods between Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan.

“Armenia fears that the ‘Nakhchivan corridor’ could impact its sovereignty and, in turn, influence its border with Iran. As the victor of the 44-day war, Azerbaijan is pushing for the fulfillment of the Moscow deal and wants Armenia to build road and rail connections along the border with Iran without passport or customs control. Tehran is aware that the ‘Nakhchivan corridor’ will connect landlocked Azerbaijan not only to its exclave but also to its regional rival Turkey,” writes the analyst. Indeed, if the ‘Nakhchivan corridor’ is built, it will provide Turkey with a new land route to the South Caucasus, which the Turkish leadership will likely use to strengthen its presence in the resource-rich region. Turkey would also gain faster access to Central Asian markets, bringing significant geopolitical victories to Ankara and enabling it to pursue some of its pan-Turkist ambitions.

All these developments could weaken Iran’s position in the region. This connection would eliminate Azerbaijan's dependence on Iran for transit and end the Islamic Republic's monopoly on transit services in the South Caucasus. The transportation corridor would also assign Baku control over the distribution of water resources from the Aras River basin.

Security is ultimately the reason why Iranian authorities fear the Nakhchivan connection. If constructed as proposed, it could be used by Iran’s enemies for military purposes. Azerbaijan, despite being predominantly a Shia country, has strong military ties with Israel, Iran’s principal adversary. It is widely known that Israeli military forces might try to use Azerbaijan’s territory in the event of a large conflict with Iran. The last thing Tehran wants to see is an Azerbaijan-Armenia peace treaty paving the way for an expanded Israeli presence.

The Islamic Republic seems intent on preventing the construction of a transit corridor through Armenian territory,” the analyst writes.

He further notes that following Tehran’s military exercises in the Aras Valley, Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian opened the Islamic Republic’s main consulate in Kapan, located in the strategically significant Syunik Province of southern Armenia, through which the ‘Nakhchivan corridor’ is expected to pass. This was yet another signal to Azerbaijan that Iran considers itself an inevitable player in the South Caucasus.

“One thing is clear: the current relations between Azerbaijan and Iran are neither friendly nor brotherly. Azerbaijan is a secular nation with Shia confessions, and it appears that this is the only thing the two countries share. Baku and Tehran have different allies, priorities, and geopolitical objectives. Thus, if Azerbaijan ultimately succeeds in constructing its portion of the Russian-backed ‘Nakhchivan corridor,’ Iran will be the second-biggest loser of the 2020 war,” the author concludes.