On June 23, US President Obama called me and said he strongly encourages us to show courage and sign the document: Serzh Sargsyan

In Kazan, Azerbaijan refused to sign the document, although we had already received a letter on June 11, 2011, signed by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov, stating that the negotiations were concluded, the text was final, and it was proposed to sign it in Kazan on June 24. This was stated by Serzh Sargsyan during an interview.

“On June 23, US President Obama called me and said he strongly encourages us to show courage and sign the document. I also received the same letter from the President of France. In both cases, I said that we were ready to sign it, but I am almost certain that Azerbaijan will refuse to sign,” Sargsyan said.

“We went to Kazan, which I have detailed while talking to Kiselyov. This is being politicized because it is being quoted partially. It is being politicized by non-entities, as they were not listening when I said that maximalism would destroy us, when I warned not to create a situation where one day we gather in Yerevan and start singing ‘Stepanakert, Stepanakert.’ Azerbaijan refused. After that, there were meetings, but it should be noted that the situation was relatively calm, and there were no actual negotiation processes.”

“If you remember, in 2014, there was significant tension. During a meeting with one of the co-chairing countries, he directly asked me what my goal was—did I want the issue to be resolved, or did I want the status quo to be maintained? I said that I wanted a resolution, to not leave the burden on the next generation.”

“To the question of how it could be resolved, I said that the issue could have two solutions: a final and a partial resolution. I envision the final one as follows: Azerbaijan recognizes the fact of Nagorno-Karabakh’s independence. In that case, I return to Yerevan and convince my colleagues that in that case, we are obliged to return seven regions to Azerbaijan, except for the corridor that forms the land connection with Armenia, which should not be the current width of 2.5 km but a sufficient corridor.”

“Then I go to Artsakh, convincing my fighting companions, the leadership of Nagorno-Karabakh, that this is the right solution. If I get agreement in both places, then gradually we start to publicize this idea. I do not guarantee that I can realize this idea, but I am ready to bear that burden, as it is the right solution.”

“The second option—a partial resolution—is that Azerbaijan acknowledges that the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh should be determined by its population without any time constraints. Azerbaijan must accept this, and the international community must confirm it. In that case, I return to Armenia and tell my colleagues that in such a scenario, we return five regions to Azerbaijan, have an interim status for Nagorno-Karabakh, and then the same process of going to Artsakh, and so on.”