This is a direct interference in the independence of judges: What awaits judges

The representatives of Nikol Pashinyan's government, who labeled judges as "whimpering behind walls," are not at ease with judicial independence, which theoretically could manifest in any courtroom. ArmLur reports.

"Recently, a long-discussed bill will be voted on in parliament, which proposes amendments to the RA Judicial Code of Constitutional Law, clearly limiting the guarantees of judicial independence. In particular, the new draft suggests that only 4 votes out of 11 members are needed to initiate proceedings against judges. Currently, the commission consists of 8 members, 6 of whom are judges and 2 are non-judge members elected by the General Assembly of Judges.

ArmLur.am learned that the new draft will increase the number of members to 11, with 5 being non-judge members and 6 being judges. Experts are confident that this will make judges more vulnerable, as the commission, composed of representatives from the public sector, will attempt to feed, pressure, and initiate disciplinary proceedings against judges, because if 4 out of 5 non-judge members vote in favor, any judge can face disciplinary action.

We spoke about the situation with lawyer and candidate of legal sciences David Vardikyan. Mr. Vardikyan, in your opinion, is the lowering of the threshold for initiating disciplinary proceedings against judges (4 votes out of 11) compatible with the constitutional guarantees of judicial independence, especially considering that these votes can be secured by non-judge members?

I will answer briefly – definitely no. This is direct interference in the independence of judges. Four individuals cannot make a decision to initiate proceedings in a committee of 11 members, especially when there will be 5 non-judge members. During the discussion of an issue related to the proceedings, at least one judge's opinion is necessary; therefore, at least 6 votes are needed to initiate proceedings, and it must be sent to the Supreme Judicial Council with no less than 8 votes.

Moreover, judges are heavily burdened with responsibilities and we simply have no right to overload them with disciplinary issues.

Does the change in the composition of the Ethics and Disciplinary Issues Committee by increasing the number of non-judge members create risks of executive or political influence over the judiciary, and how does this align with the principle of separation of powers?

Undoubtedly, this risk is created. It turns out that people coming from the "outside," who often have no idea about what happens "inside," do not know what problems exist, which are objective and which are subjective, will have to make decisions about whether there is a basis to initiate proceedings against a judge or not. They will turn the initiation of proceedings against a judge into a "normal" occurrence.

Can indirect pressure on judges be exerted through representatives of the public sector if it is sufficient for almost unanimous positions of non-judge members to initiate disciplinary proceedings?

Of course. It turns out that individuals with some public activism can write a status on Facebook regarding a judge, and 4 out of the non-judge members can initiate proceedings against that judge based on that status.

Regarding the provision proposed in the draft, stating that a non-judge member of the committee cannot represent judicial authority during their term, can it be applied retroactively, as proposed in the legal commission meeting on 14.01.2026?

Does giving this norm retroactive effect not constitute a deteriorating legal regulation, and does it not contradict the principles of legal certainty and trust enshrined in the RA Constitution?

Again, my answer is definite. There cannot be a change that deteriorates an individual's legal situation with retroactive effect. It is clear that this change will worsen the legal situation of non-judge members of the committee. If I am not mistaken, that position is a paid one, meaning that a person elected to this position expects to receive compensation for a period of 4 years, while they are deprived of their legitimate expectations by an unconstitutional change. Additionally, there were no restrictions during the elections, despite the fact that this draft had been circulating for a long time and had received negative feedback. Addressing it retroactively at this stage, especially when this retroaction pertains only to one non-judge member, I believe, is highly problematic and could also be targeted.

As a result, there will also be interference in the exercise of judges' electoral rights. I am confident that if they appeal to the Venice Commission regarding this change, they will undoubtedly receive a negative opinion, as was the case recently when the threshold was again set in a way that could be overcome without the voting of a judge member," the publication writes.