Serzh Sargsyan's Letter to the President of Russia

On August 5, 2016, Serzh Sargsyan sent a letter to Russian President Vladimir Putin regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict resolution. The Armenian government has made public this letter along with other documents related to the negotiation process.

"The Madrid Principles, as well as the so-called Kazan Document, while not fully aligned with the demands and expectations of the Armenian side, were nevertheless somewhat balanced. As you know, Armenia did not accept the amendments and comments made to the Kazan Document on the condition that Azerbaijan would respond in kind. Unfortunately, the President of Azerbaijan, in a predictable response to appeals from the co-chairing countries and the international community, presented amendments contrary to the previously agreed formulations in Kazan. Moreover, Azerbaijan even rejected some of the Madrid Principles that the parties had been working on since 2007 under the mediation of the co-chairing countries," he wrote in his letter.

Sargsyan pointed out that Azerbaijan had abandoned some of the Madrid Principles and pursues a dangerous formula of "first territories, then the rest," which would allow Baku to disrupt the process at any time. He also noted that Azerbaijan continues to deliberately escalate tensions, just as before the large-scale aggression that occurred in April 2016.

He stated that Baku refuses to implement the agreements reached in Vienna and St. Petersburg, particularly regarding the establishment of mechanisms for investigating incidents and expanding the capabilities of the OSCE representative.

Sargsyan criticized the new proposals conveyed by Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov, as they reduce the Armenian "security zones" and disrupt the military balance without clear commitments from Azerbaijan regarding the future status of Nagorno-Karabakh or a referendum. He warned that after obtaining five regions, Azerbaijan would exert even greater pressure to reclaim Kelbajar and Lachin.

He made specific remarks: "In the presented ideas, in response to the serious concerns of the Armenian side, no counter-steps are expected from Azerbaijan. This meant for us a significant reduction of the 'security zones' and substantial shortening of the contact line in the conflict zone, which was based on the fortified line of troops. This led to a breach of the military balance, which was ensured by superiority over the opposing armed forces. The real 'security zone' can only be the territory that compensates for the side declared by the co-chairing countries. Essentially, Azerbaijan does not undertake clear obligations regarding the future referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh and the interim status of the NKR. I am convinced that after obtaining five regions, Azerbaijan will become even more destructive. It is evident that Baku hopes that by receiving those regions, it will strengthen military and diplomatic pressure on Armenia to regain Kelbajar and Lachin, along with other territories, aiming to disregard references to its internal legislation and principled agreements concerning the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh.

In practice, Aliyev demands to resolve his issues solely via an indefinite option, and through an absolutely unclear and unspecified referendum. The unrealistic prospects of this referendum, which has undergone multiple changes since May 2009, confirm his principled disagreement on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh and the interim status. Although this specificity sharply limits Azerbaijan's ambition to limit the Nagorno-Karabakh Armenian circles within the framework of Azerbaijani statehood. With a bit of attention, he continuously presents permanent references to the Azerbaijani Constitution as an obstacle to conducting a referendum in Nagorno-Karabakh, as an internal issue of Azerbaijan.

However, in Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh, they are fewer. Thus, the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, who fully complied with the legislation of the USSR and international law in 1991 by means of a referendum, became an independent state. They are proposed to renounce that independence and suffer heavy losses for a questionable future offered by an indefinite referendum, which has been postponed indefinitely. Moreover, Aliyev excludes even the possibility of holding the referendum in the distant future.

Parties should seek ways to overcome existing obstacles, rather than trying to justify the impossibility of fulfilling mutually acceptable agreements. Compromises are only possible in the presence of political will. The implementation of Lavrov's ideas will be effective, provided that the Azerbaijani side fulfills several key aspects that are crucial for the Armenian side. In particular, we deem necessary to: 1. Provide for the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh at all stages of the settlement. 2. Ensure that any popular vote expressing the free will of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh is accepted proportionally by any person residing in the NKR as of 1988, based on the proportions that existed during the last census conducted in the USSR before the start of the conflict. The formulation of the issues to be put to vote or the choice of selection should not be limited, assuming any choice possibility (this formulation is present in the negotiation documents and has been transmitted to the OSCE Secretariat for preservation). 3. Ensure that when determining the final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh, the Kelbajar and Lachin regions remain under the complete control of Nagorno-Karabakh. 4. Emphasize that the decision on the final status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be recorded as an