Yerevan Hits Wall to Wall: Moscow Observes – You Decided to Play Backgammon, So Play On – Tarasov

According to the newspaper "Hraparak," the intrigue in Sochi has ended with a rather neutral statement, demonstrating how much longer we have to go in achieving clarity on issues that concern us regarding Azerbaijan. The final statement does not include the term "Artsakh," which is bad, but it also does not contain the word "corridor," which is good. The political arena in Armenia evaluated the Sochi statement as a document that did not deliver the desired outcomes. But how do Russian political scientists assess it? We spoke with Stanislav Tarasov, a Russian political scientist and expert on issues in the Middle East and the Caucasus, who is considered one of the spokespersons for official Moscow.

- How do you evaluate where Armenia has reached with this statement and what it gave to Azerbaijan?

- Expectations regarding this trilateral meeting were diverse, even sensational. Many thought that Moscow would present some new proposals, especially since Pashinyan had talked to Putin for an hour the day before and asked for the mention of Karabakh in the statement. However, the statement consists of general phrases; known theses are reiterated, but Karabakh is absent.

- Karabakh is absent, but it is referenced as the area of deployment for Russian peacekeepers.

- Yes, Putin said during the press conference that many issues were touched upon, but certain positions were not reflected in the statement. He also mentioned that the negotiation process would continue, as well as the search for solutions, and that he is fundamentally not against the agreements reached in Prague, as long as they lead to peace, even without Russia's participation. While we understand the goals that the West is setting by intensifying efforts in the direction of Karabakh. Hence, the conclusion is that Moscow ceases to consider itself the main negotiation platform and also recognizes the Western platform. Thus, this statement also expresses Azerbaijan's interests, which are based on five known principles and the agreements that were signed in the trilateral format starting from the statement of November 9, 2020. There are no other details.

- There is no news regarding the peace treaty, in fact.

- The preparation of the peace treaty is practically underway. According to some data, there is some framework that supposedly Azerbaijan has prepared, which Armenia is working on, but this is not mentioned in the statement. Nor are the American and Brussels platforms referred to. As far as I know, Aliyev and Pashinyan will again meet in Brussels in December, and it is very likely that they will sign some agreement, possibly a peace treaty. The intrigue is what conditions this will be under. Because the logic of a peace treaty implies that you recognize Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. And if Armenia signs this, it also acknowledges that Karabakh is part of Azerbaijan. That’s logical. The third point is that Armenian diplomacy, with the help of the European Council, is trying to revitalize the Minsk Group to determine the fate of the remaining Armenian enclave in Artsakh. But here lies a double step, considering that during the war, Armenia refused to recognize Artsakh.

- The statement implies that Russian peacekeepers are required; will their mandate be extended?

- Our peacekeepers do not actually have an international mandate, as they did in Abkhazia, where they had a mandate. Legally, this merely means the presence of a certain contingent of Russian armed forces within Azerbaijan's territory. In that case, unfortunately, we are obliged to determine the fate of Russian peacekeepers by exclusively negotiating their deployment timelines with Baku, without Yerevan.

- But Pashinyan has said that the deployment of Russian peacekeepers will be extended for at least 20 years.

- Nikol Pashinyan says one thing, but you want me to analyze what is actually happening, right? In reality, legally such an option is opening. The other point is that the mandate may be extended, or it might not be extended. In an exceptional case, it is possible that Aliyev might confer some status on Karabakh, granting it a San Marino-like status, but whatever it is, it will only be within Azerbaijan. As a result, formal contradictions have not disappeared. Diplomatic efforts continue, and now everyone is waiting for what benefits the Western game will bring. It was unexpected for us that Putin adopted a neutral stance, maximized in the statement.

- Why, what is this related to?

- Most likely, Moscow does not believe that the West is currently capable of playing a big game, given that there are crazy events happening in Europe, there is a crisis; we do not believe that in this situation they are capable and interested in playing a major game in the South Caucasus. If you want to go to the West, then go ahead, we do not object, as long as you can reach an agreement.

- Was there any talk of a corridor in Sochi? There is nothing in the statement.

- Azerbaijan has initiated this issue. The November 9 statement does not mention anything about the Zangezur corridor. Armenia offers its version, and this is purely a matter of debate. But there is a delimitation problem that cannot be realized without Russian maps. The Brussels agenda has the same issues as the Moscow one. They may sign a peace treaty, but on what basis will the delimitation be carried out? Based on personal agreements between Pashinyan and Aliyev or using some other maps? They could use the maps from 2018-2020 that Armenia presented at the Versailles conference in 2019. But if delimitation is done based on Russian maps, then it turns out that Russia is present. Russia, as a real force and factor, exists, but it has adopted a position of neutrality, a position of equal distance from both Armenia and Azerbaijan.

- Aren't we your strategic partner?

- The reasons are varied. We see how Yerevan is hitting wall to wall between Moscow and Brussels, and Aliyev does not hinder this game. For him, it does not matter where the peace treaty is signed – in Moscow, Brussels, or Tehran – because it is about his terms. Moscow is observing this way – you decided to play backgammon, so play on. Let’s see who benefits.

- Can we say that Russia has returned to the role of a moderator in the region?

- No, Russia has renounced the role of the main moderator and has become one of the moderators.