What Does Russia Want from Armenia?

In our region, Russia's desires fit into its chain of global ambitions, and Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh are links in this chain. Russia wants from Armenia almost what it wants from Ukraine: for Armenia to become part of a "Russia-Belarus" union state or part of Russia itself. In the case of Ukraine, Russia employs its own and possibly Belarusian troops to achieve this outcome, while in Armenia, it utilizes Azerbaijani forces and to some extent, the Russian troops stationed in Armenia.

The essence of these actions is to demonstrate Armenia's vulnerability in terms of security, prompting it to hastily apply for membership in a "Russia-Belarus" union state. This logic is reinforced by Azerbaijan's aggression, the inertia of the Russian forces stationed in Armenia, Russia's political passivity, and its failure to fulfill its obligations to supply weapons to Armenia. The latter tactic is not a coincidence and has been used before, for example, before and after the 2016 war. Armenia must be as vulnerable as possible to cling firmly to Russia.

The case of Nagorno-Karabakh also fits into this logic, albeit with some differences. Russia needs the unresolved status of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, meaning that it should remain unsettled, as leverage over both Armenia and Azerbaijan. This desire has been the cornerstone of the status quo that has existed for decades in the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict zone, allowing the Armenian political strategy to endlessly continue negotiations based on this cornerstone. This continued until 2011, after which Russia gradually reached the necessity of altering the status quo.

This conclusion was reached by Russia not because it wants to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh issue but because it has begun to understand that it cannot maintain the status quo. A key reason for this is Turkey's growing role and the significance of Turkey's relatively balanced position for Russia in the face of an irreversible confrontation with the West. This is where one must look for the cause of the 44-day war.

Moreover, in predictable or planned confrontational conditions with the West, where it was clear that Western transportation routes would have to be closed or at least come under suspicion, it was extremely important for Russia to ensure the relatively smooth operation of the Dardanelles and Bosporus straits (otherwise, the Black Sea would have become an ordinary lake for Russia), as well as to secure land connections to the West through Turkey.

The route through Russia-Georgia-Turkey would not resolve the issue of new land flows, as the routes passing through them could not be opened due to conflicts in Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Furthermore, the Upper Lars was still overloaded before the Ukrainian conflict. Hence, the effective solution to this issue would be to utilize the Armenia-Azerbaijan axis.

This is why the Lavrov plan regarding the Nagorno-Karabakh issue envisaged the transfer of southern regions to Azerbaijan, in order to remove obstacles from the Ordubad-Meghri-Horadiz railway and highways. In this sense, despite public statements, Russia is the main stakeholder in the corridor through Armenian territory, as both Azerbaijan and Turkey, as well as Russia, want a corridor to be established under Russian control through Armenian territory. The key aspect here is the last factor, as there are also highways through Iranian territory. A railway could be built through Iran as well.

The less than successful developments in Ukraine have effectively exacerbated the situation established after 2011, where Russia now finds it difficult to be the guarantor of the status quo established after 2020; Khzraberd and Parukh are vivid evidence of this. Turkey and Azerbaijan's roles have increased, and now Azerbaijan can become a platform for the export of gas and oil from Russia to the EU.