Not Everything is Lost, Much Can Be Restored: Vardan Oskanian on the Artsakh Issue

Former Armenian Foreign Minister Vardan Oskanian has shared an article with the media regarding the current phase of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and the pursuit of the right to self-determination. He states, "The provision on the expression of the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh in the Madrid and later Kazan documents is perhaps one of the most significant achievements of our newly independent state in these thirty years. It is explicitly stated in black and white that 'The final legal status of Nagorno-Karabakh will be determined through a plebiscite, which provides the residents of Nagorno-Karabakh with a free and genuine expression of will. The timelines and details of the plebiscite will be agreed upon by the parties in future negotiations [...].' By the 'population of Nagorno-Karabakh,' it is understood that all ethnicities living in the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast based on the national composition of 1988 are included, with the same ethnic balance that existed before the start of the conflict. During the plebiscite, there will be no restrictions on the formulation of the question or questions, and any status opportunity may be allowed.

We should not squander this achievement in the fervor to justify all the negative and unacceptable consequences brought about by the 44-day war and to shift all failures onto previous administrations. Regardless of what Azerbaijan and Turkey say, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has not been resolved. It was unresolved from 1918 to 1920, throughout the Soviet era, over the past thirty years, and it remains unresolved today. The aforementioned provision regarding the expression of the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh is still very much needed.

This provision, which first found its place in the Madrid document, was achieved with great difficulty, requiring numerous diplomatic maneuvers and the serious efforts of mediating countries. The true value of this provision lies in its perception by mediator states and the international community at large. It is this that the Armenian side must utilize in its international diplomacy, rather than undermine its value for domestic issues.

Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan's recent statements in parliament, claiming that 'there was not even a theoretical possibility for Artsakh not to be part of Azerbaijan with the negotiation agenda received in 2018' and that 'by 2016, the negotiation process had been a disaster, and Artsakh had lost all practical and theoretical opportunities to be outside of Azerbaijan' are concerning, as they close off the opportunity to use the established provision for self-determination. It is even more troubling if this is a harbinger of potential justifications that may follow the signing of a document recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh directly or indirectly as part of Azerbaijan.

Let me first say that the signing of such a document cannot have any justification. Regardless of when and how negotiation documents might theoretically allow for the self-determination of Nagorno-Karabakh, there can be no justification for signing a document recognizing Nagorno-Karabakh as part of Azerbaijan. Moreover, an individual cannot possess such a right, as it is not an individual decision to make.

The provision enshrined in the Madrid document offers both theoretical and practical opportunities for the self-determination of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh, and if desired and capable, the Armenian side has the opportunity to utilize this to the fullest today.

However, let's now discuss '3+3'. This regional format was first proposed by Armenia in the early 2000s. It is a proposal from the winning side. At that time, we aimed to legitimize the status quo. Azerbaijan and Turkey rejected it. Today, these two are proposing the same format, pursuing the exact same goal: to legitimize the current status quo. It would have been better if Armenia, as Turkey and Azerbaijan did before, rejected any participation. However, if the Armenian side has decided to participate, it must at least have its own agenda.

It is beyond doubt that Turkey and Azerbaijan will dictate the agenda there, while other countries will naturally bring their own agendas. In this format, Armenia should put three issues on the table: a) the withdrawal of Azerbaijani armed forces from Armenia's sovereign territory, b) the full and unconditional return of prisoners, and c) the reopening of communication routes without preconditions. But this is not all. There is the delicate issue of Nagorno-Karabakh. On one hand, it is necessary to exclude the resolution of the issue from being part of the '3+3' agenda. On the other hand, the absence of any discussion about Nagorno-Karabakh will pour water into Azerbaijan's mill, suggesting that such a problem no longer exists in the region. Here, it is possible to find the right approach.

What can be done on the Nagorno-Karabakh front, and how can the provision on the people's expression of will be used? One of the manifestations of my negotiation style when I was a minister was the approach of 'I do not rule anything out; we can talk about this,' even when an unacceptable option was placed on the table by the adversary or mediators. I found that in the end, it could yield the desired outcome. We often placed proposals on the table, fully aware that their subsequent rejection was inevitable. In this way, it was possible to draw the adversary into negotiations on even the most unacceptable questions for them. This was the way we managed to achieve Nagorno-Karabakh’s accession to Armenia in the Key West negotiations, in return for Azerbaijan merely having a secondary connection through Nakhchivan along the banks of the Araks River. It was also through this methodology that we secured the right to self-determination for the people of Nagorno-Karabakh enshrined in the negotiation document.

Armenia today finds itself at a crucial and fateful crossroads where only bold, skillful, and flexible diplomacy can bring about a shift in the situation. But before doing so, the Armenian side must first enshrine two fundamental principles for itself: a) the consideration of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast as a complete political entity, and b) the right of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh to self-determination within the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast. Based on these two principles, the Armenian side must identify and first present its 'I do not rule out' option to the mediators, marking the beginning of a new phase of negotiations for resolving the Artsakh issue within the framework of the Minsk Group.

Not everything is lost; much can still be restored.