Military Leadership Deployed Its Last Forces to the Battlefield: What Parents of Missing Servicemen Report

The information from the Tsori military unit was lacking because the unit was fragmented. One battalion was in Mataghis, another in the direction of Karmir Shuka, and another in the Horadiz direction. This was stated today, September 9, by the parent of one of the missing servicemen from the Tsori military unit’s artillery division.

They reported that during the 44-day war, the artillery division had been affected by an enemy sabotage group, resulting in 21 missing servicemen. “We carried out our own investigation and uncovered a lot of details, understanding who the immediate responsible parties and guilty persons are. According to our applications, a criminal case has been initiated, and recently, the head of the division's staff, Gevorg Gevorgyan, has been arrested,” they said.

The parent of the missing servicemen recounted what they had discovered regarding the hostilities that began on September 27. “Upon commencing combat operations, the division occupied its operational area within the military unit, which was located in the direction of Aghdam, then occupied its main firing positions in the village of Vazgenashen. From there, it carried out its combat operations until October 5. On October 5, it received an order to march towards the direction of Hadrut. As we know, our units were in quite a severe condition in that direction. In the vicinity of Hadrut, the division occupied a firing position in an area referred to as ‘Jrashar’.”

“According to the orders of the higher command and following the instructions of the head of the Army's artillery, they advanced towards Hadrut city, passing through it; there is an area called ‘9th Kilometer’ where they occupied firing positions. It turned out that those firing positions were occupied to carry out counterattacks. In my opinion, those who decided to conduct the counterattack committed a gross violation, since conducting a counterattack requires at least three conditions to be met: the enemy must be halted, but at that time, the enemy was not halted; the enemy must not have nearby reserves, which they had, and we should have had sufficient reserves to carry out that counterattack. In fact, the military leadership had deployed its last forces to the battlefield and put them out of action,” they noted.

According to them, for years, these two military units had not conducted any exercises regarding combat operations in that area. “Thus, the terrain was completely unfamiliar to them, and due to intense combat operations, there was a high probability of confusion and making gross mistakes. After the failure of the counterattack, the division barely managed to escape from the ‘9th Kilometer’ area, leaving behind certain equipment and supplies, as gunfire was heard, while the artillery, being quite far back, should not have been able to hear the sound of the gunfire. They return to the area called ‘Jrashar’, where they had firing positions, but the command, represented by the head of the artillery, Genadi Baghdasaryan, gives the instruction to advance forward to occupy firing positions to execute tasks there. The commanders studied the terrain and selected a firing position in an area called ‘Juvarlu’, which was already on October 8. They outfitted the firing position, and the division occupied it and began to execute tasks. Orders were given by the head of artillery to fire towards the direction of Hadrut, even though the main direction of this division was towards their units, more towards the east, but tasks were given towards the south, in the direction of Hadrut.”

They reported that in that direction, two days of intense battles occurred, during which on October 10, the division’s 3rd battery was struck by UAVs. “Having obtained permission from the army's artillery department, the division withdrew and occupied firing positions again in the area called ‘Jrashar’. However, a few hours later, Colonel Baghdasaryan again instructed them, asking what they were doing, indicating they had retreated too far and should advance to occupy another place; at that time, intense battles were ongoing, and it was impossible to select and outfit other places. The division, with no alternative, again occupied the firing position in ‘Juvarlu’, as occupying a firing position in an open area without crew shelters was tantamount to suicide. They returned to that firing position and continued to execute firing tasks, again directed towards Hadrut. They had hardly performed tasks for the benefit of their own unit's subunits; all were directed towards Hadrut. The firing distance had come to be 4-5 kilometers. The command of the division was unable to ascertain where the enemy was and where the front line was. The command post of the unit, which was supposed to lead the unit's subdivisions, was located in the Aghdam direction.”