The Failure of Negotiations Would Eventually Lead to War: Interview with David Tonoyan

In an interview with Mediamax, former Armenian Minister of Defense David Tonoyan discussed various issues surrounding the aftermath of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh.

- Since the end of the war, your well-known phrase “new war for new territories” has been a topic of discussion both in Armenia and beyond. Specifically, it was mentioned by the Russian Foreign Minister at the press conference on January 18. Do you regret that statement?

- About a year and a half ago, during a meeting with the Armenian community in the U.S., that statement was a response to the declarations by the military-political leadership of Azerbaijan, asserting the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue through military means, which was “justified” by the ineffectiveness of negotiations. No matter how much Aliyev and certain political figures in Armenia insist, that statement alone could not serve as a pretext for the failure of negotiations and the resumption of war. By the same logic, a war could have started every day, as Azerbaijan’s leaders have constantly spoken about a military solution to the issue. Moreover, for decades, the world has ignored Aliyev’s statements that “Yerevan is a historical Azerbaijani territory.” It must be clearly stated that the party that turned its back on a peaceful political settlement of the conflict was Azerbaijan. The initiator of disrupting the negotiation process and starting the war was Ilham Aliyev, aided and supported by Turkey.

In my deep conviction, fortification of geographical lines occupied by Armenian armed forces since 1994, organization of combat duty on the frontline, and rearmament with modern weapons and technology did not solve the pressing issue of ensuring the security and economic development of the Armenian population in Nagorno-Karabakh in the long term. What was the ultimate goal of preserving those areas delineated by the aforementioned lines? Restoring historical justice, ensuring the long-term and stable security of the Armenian people in Nagorno-Karabakh and the Republic of Armenia, or creating favorable conditions for the negotiation process regarding the return of territories in exchange for the internationally recognized status of Nagorno-Karabakh? Definitely not; none of the three. Ensuring long-term and stable security and economic development under the existing geopolitical circumstances was not feasible with the current geographic lines and the conceptual defensive posture, and the failure of negotiations would eventually lead to war. Therefore, within the framework of defensive and foreign policies pursued over the past 26 years and given the existing social and demographic-economic opportunities, under non-war conditions, the continuous “advantageous” resolution process for the Armenian side was ensured.

- You stated that in case of war, the Armenian side should move operations to enemy territory. You mentioned that, if necessary, our assault groups could create chaos behind the enemy lines. Why did that not happen?

- Yes, the creation and training of the aforementioned assault units to operate in enemy territory, the rearmament of the Armed Forces with multifunctional fighters, various UAVs, and precision artillery systems, as well as the development of reconnaissance and special operational capabilities would eventually lead to conceptual changes. However, the modernization plan for the Armed Forces, approved by the decree of the President of the Republic of Armenia on February 17, 2018, and the development plan for the armed forces, revised and accepted again by the Security Council in 2019, along with the government-reviewed “Arms and Military Technology Development Program” and the initiated “Defense Strategic Review” were not fully implemented. We did not manage to prepare for the “unnoticed” war using fifth-generation weapons. In the vision published on June 9, 2020, regarding the priorities of development in the defense sector and armed forces, I stated that a large-scale rearmament process had begun—from firearms to long-range missile systems and combat multifunctional aviation—but we were still at the beginning of the road.

The rearmament aimed particularly at equipping armed force units with mobile, modern, and highly precise weapons that would operate in an automated control domain and ensure the decentralized autonomous actions of the units. I am convinced that we had no alternative but to wage war in this format. All statements were made considering the possible actions of the enemy and the predictions regarding regional developments, but these were based on an insufficient assessment of the risks of Turkey's direct involvement and the massive mobilization of mercenaries, along with the total blockade of supply routes. If my proposed programmatic and conceptual approaches are considered “grandiose,” “detached from reality,” and “bluster,” then the incompetence, weakness, and manifestations of melancholy exhibited by certain Armenian political figures are simply a threat to our people's security. We suffered defeat in all aspects of an unequal battle, but that does not give anyone the right to play with our people's national dignity. This psychologically exhausting political nightmare needs to be stopped, and instead of injecting a sense of inferiority into people, we should analyze mistakes, learn lessons, and work hard. We have paid an incredibly high price, with thousands of young lives sacrificed in defense of our homeland and interests, and defeatist rhetoric dishonors their memory.

- Many claim that after working with the second and third presidents of Armenia for nearly two decades, you committed betrayal by agreeing to be part of Nikol Pashinyan's government.

- In the spring of 2018, when I agreed to take on the role of Minister of Defense, I was guided exclusively by a sense of duty. I worked for the Republic of Armenia, and those “many” you refer to either have stereotypical notions about public service—especially in fields concerning defense and security—or are motivated by other incentives and interests. I tend to consider the hypothesis of other interests, as I can see how diligently and consistently unfounded rumors starting in Azerbaijani Telegram channels about me and my family are brought into the Armenian media space.

As for the interpersonal relationships with former and current figures, they are in a strictly personal domain, and if they are subject to external evaluation, they usually turn into gossip.

- In 2.5 years, the Armed Forces have frequently received direct or covert attacks from the ruling power or from NGOs closely linked to it. Why haven’t you publicly responded to these?

- I am an advocate of practical and flexible methods for managing change. One of the main factors hindering the necessary and required process of changes is people’s natural inclination towards inertia. People resist changes, as they can cause them discomfort. We live in Armenia, where “maintaining face” plays a significant role in interpersonal relations, and I have preferred to work patiently with all parties, hoping for a change in awareness or perception both from the power partners and representatives of NGOs.

- Chief of Staff Onik Gasparyan stated that during the Security Council meeting on June 12, 2020, he reported that “our adversary is no longer just Azerbaijan, but Turkey as well. Therefore, Armenia cannot effectively counterbalance the combined military force of these states, and it is necessary to direct all political and diplomatic potential to avoid war or at least postpone it.” What was your position during that Security Council meeting?

- It was reported that the Ministry of Defense and the General Staff had a systematic and coordinated approach.

- In that case, how appropriate do you find the PR campaign related to the July battles in Tavush, which could not help but cause additional concern to Azerbaijan and Turkey?

- The “PR campaign” you refer to and the “additional concern” for Azerbaijan and Turkey were the last things that interested us as representatives of the Armed Forces. From a military objectives perspective, the actions of the Armed Forces were almost flawless. However, we were surprised by the unstable behavior of Aliyev and the Azerbaijani elite, compounded by Turkey's rather harsh “brotherly” assurances regarding punishing Armenia for “not mastering regional realities and destabilizing the situation.”

- Onik Gasparyan also mentioned that on the fourth day of the war, he stated that measures needed to be taken within 2-3 days to halt the war; otherwise, the conditions for a negotiation process would become less favorable by each subsequent day. What was your position?

- The Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces have honestly and selflessly done more than what was possible for victory. The analysis made based on the cold calculations of the General Staff was coordinated with me.

- Numerous publications and testimonies indicate that there was chaos in the Armed Forces, and individuals without proper authority participated in planning military operations. How could such a situation arise?

- I am confident that under conditions of stabilizing the internal political situation, an investigation will take place, and answers to all such questions will be provided.

- What do you consider your greatest personal oversight during this war?

- I could not overcome the ambiguity regarding the command line between the Prime Minister, the Minister of Defense, and the Chief of Staff during wartime and the hindrances that arose from it, particularly concerning issues regarding mobilization, the role and functions of the Security Council, the functions and official relations between the Armed Forces of Armenia and the Artsakh Defense Army, and the organization of self-defense in Artsakh and the evacuation of the population. With the new constitution adopted in 2015, the Minister of Defense is largely out of the process of planning and conducting military operations during wartime, as those powers are reserved for the Supreme Commander and the Chief of the General Staff. After the constitutional amendments, an attempt was made to regulate this ambiguity in the “Law on Defense,” which, as life has shown, was still insufficient.

However, as I stated in my address on November 20, I am ready to bear my share of the responsibility.

- During and after the war, much has been discussed about whether Russia supported its ally Armenia or not. What is your assessment?

- Throughout the war, I was in constant communication with Russian Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu. There were days when we spoke several times a day over the phone. For understandable reasons, I do not disclose all details, but I can unequivocally say that during the ongoing war, Russia did the utmost in fulfilling its alliance obligations. Moreover, thanks to our continuous working contacts with the Russian Defense Minister, we managed to address several other important issues outside of pure defense matters.