The Armed Forces’ ‘I Am’ Program Needs Reconstruction or Closure: Tigran Abrahamyan

We present an article by Tigran Abrahamyan, head of the Analytical Center 'Hyanakert' and former security advisor to the President of Artsakh, where the author addresses the ‘I Am’ program operating in the Armed Forces, its advantages, and shortcomings.

“The ‘I Am’ program has been functioning in the Armed Forces for three years, and according to the official justification from the Ministry of Defense, it aims to encourage those who have made the decision to serve on the front line. Participants of the program serve for three years, yet seven months of that time is spent on leave starting from the sixth month, when their unit takes on combat duty, serving each month in a 1+1+2 formula: one week on leave, one week at the unit preparing for combat duty, and two weeks serving on the front line.

However, this alluring aspect of the program does not end there. After five months of training, program participants begin their service, spending 31 months total, of which 7 are spent at home and 24 at the unit and combat positions. Each time they go on leave, a certain amount of money is paid to cover leave expenses. At the end of their service, approximately 5 million AMD is credited to their personal account, which can be used in one of three targeted programs: 1. Affordable housing (subsidized mortgage program) 2. Mini-farm (a program for creating a small greenhouse or farm for rural servicemen or acquiring small agricultural machinery) 3. Tuition reimbursement.

For the past three years, I have been continuously studying the characteristics of the program and have met with many servicemen participating in it, also discussing the program with various unit leaders and commanders. Indeed, like various programs across different sectors, many issues become apparent once the program is put in motion. My analyses show that the conditions are quite favorable for servicemen participating in the program. Interestingly, in addition to the officially prescribed benefits, there are also hidden advantages connected to the peculiarities of military service.

As these are narrow, service-specific details, I cannot elaborate much, but I will give a simple example. Unlike soldiers drafted under normal conditions, participants in the ‘I Am’ program are notably less often in the ranks, although certain changes due to reorganization have occurred, resulting in some changes to both the ranks and overall service. Nevertheless, the benefits remain substantial. In certain instances, officers view them as contracted servicemen, which logically aligns with the nature of the program.

Yes, certain issues arose due to the pandemic, but overall, the program maintains its attractive nature; however, legal regulations must define the rights and obligations of parties—the Ministry of Defense and the serviceman in various circumstances. For example, if there is a force majeure situation (not to be understood as military actions or border tensions), the state must determine how to compensate servicemen for unpaid leaves in such cases. While it may not be appropriate to discuss this issue during military action, it is debatable, particularly in a pandemic situation, especially since it does not have a short-term nature. Otherwise, the program will be severely affected and face significant issues of appeal.

One of the most appealing provisions of this program is the ability to take a one-week leave once a month, which significantly eases the servicemen's service experience. If we consider the issue from the unit's or officers' perspective, however, there are more challenges. Again, for understandable reasons, I will not delve into many service-specific issues, but numerous ongoing queries arise from them. There are lifestyle issues in the training programs, and naturally, those I have listed are merely the minimum problems suitable for publication.

I am more surprised by the fact that the number of participants in this immensely appealing program is not increasing; rather, it has been constantly declining since its inception. I mostly attribute this to the Ministry of Defense not making noticeable efforts to popularize the program. Essentially, the program is not among priorities, which may stem from issues related to organizing their service in everyday life and solving combat tasks. If the risks I mentioned are present, then there are two options: either close the program or reconstruct it. In the latter case, one must thoroughly investigate issues related to harmonizing the program with actual service, amend several provisions outlined in the contract, ensure personnel are involved in activities planned to enhance combat readiness, and of course, implement all issues related to border protection and defense.

I am predominantly inclined toward closing the program and redirecting the funds allocated for it toward contracted service programs. If our goal is to improve service on the front lines, increase personnel, and so on, it would be more efficient to implement various measures encouraging contracted service. At least in its current form, the program has yet to demonstrate its full efficiency. My conviction is driven by the issues that are, unfortunately, not appropriate to discuss publicly, but I cannot refrain from presenting my views and suggestions on this matter.”