Onik Gasparyan Responds to Statements by Nikol Pashinyan

General- Lieutenant Onik Gasparyan has issued a statement where he notes: "Dear compatriots, my fellow military personnel, in light of the explanations presented by the Prime Minister of Armenia in the investigative committee aimed at studying the circumstances of the military operations unleashed on September 27, 2020, I find it appropriate to address the questions raised and present my stance and clarifications:

1. I consider the public discussion of questions related to the preparation and conduct of the war to be unacceptable.

2. The Prime Minister should evaluate not only the actions of the armed forces but also present the activities of the entire state management system, noting both the positive and negative aspects, as well as the objective and subjective reasons for failures.

3. While clarifying the unrealistic analyses I provided to the Prime Minister regarding the likely nature of the opponent’s composition and actions as well as the capabilities of their armed forces before the war, I should mention that I partially addressed this in my statement on November 17, 2020. However, now, while maintaining the requirements for confidentiality, I will present excerpts from the reports I delivered at various consultations and meetings before the war.

- On July 4, 2020, I presented a report in the General Staff of the Armed Forces to the Prime Minister and the members of the National Security Council, with the participation of deputy chief of the General Staff and heads of major departments, outlining the additional measures needed to prepare the troops for countering the likely aggression of the opponent in the existing geopolitical situation. Based on a comprehensive assessment of the created situation, I proposed to the Prime Minister to undertake political and diplomatic measures to prevent the war or, at least, to create conditions favorable for the application of the RA Armed Forces, specifically instructing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to develop a program of measures aimed at drastically improving relations with the participant states of the Collective Security Treaty Organization (especially Russia) and fostering amicable relations with other regional states (Iran and Georgia) and, using the potential of the Armenian diaspora, neutralizing anti-Armenian provocations from Turkish and Azerbaijani communities in leading countries around the world and organizing measures against their bellicose policies...

- During a National Security Council meeting held on July 10, 2020, I reported to the Prime Minister on the draft state program for the development of armaments and military equipment for the years 2020-2024, according to which approximately 8 billion USD was required to address the tasks assigned to the armed forces...

- In the second half of August 2020, I reported at a National Security Council meeting that the effectiveness of the overall air defense forces was assessed as 'weak', and with the existing electronic warfare forces and means, it was not possible to effectively suppress the opponent’s control systems; the capabilities of reconnaissance bodies for the effective reconnaissance, operational control, and communication of information related to the opponent were weak. The number of drones in the armed forces does not ensure the fulfillment of combat tasks. To fight against the opponent's UAVs, air defense and electronic warfare measures, as well as a sufficient number of drones, are necessary. These, of course, are included in the draft state program for the development of armaments and military equipment 2020-2024, but mainly at a secondary level, and the possibilities for their procurement are minimal since the budget cannot solve these issues. However, it is necessary to acquire modern, long-range multi-functional reconnaissance and strike UAVs...

At the same time, it is necessary to mobilize our resources through the Ministry of High Technology Industry, clarify the production capabilities of companies, the current numbers of reconnaissance and strike UAVs, and the possible timelines for providing these to the RA armed forces. In the draft state program for the development of armaments and military equipment 2020-2024, we have established that we should have our own reconnaissance and communication satellites in geostationary orbit or rent reconnaissance and communication organization satellites. The rent would amount to ... AMD, while acquiring one would cost ... AMD.

During the last two years, the question of outfitting the Defense Army with surveillance systems has been resolved 100%, yet we still face challenges in other operational directions. At the same time, there are also problems in creating second and third layers of surveillance systems and in terms of engineering, technical, logistical, and medical support, particularly ...

It is critical to modernize the fire control systems of tanks, as the equipment used in the armed forces does not meet modern combat requirements based on their main tactical and technical specifications and technical condition, especially for conducting combat at night ... The decentralization of ammunition storage is also a pressing issue. For decentralizing the ammunition storage of the armed forces, ensuring the determinable organization, centralizing in operational directions, bringing closer to the zones of operational usage of the troops, and protecting them from probable strikes from the opponent, the RA armed forces need underground (tunnel-type) ammunition storages ...

The existing supply of material property does not meet the mandated demand for conducting military operations (for the personnel being complemented, new formations, operational and troop supplies ...). A crucial issue for medical support is the evacuation of the wounded from the battlefield and providing specialized medical assistance since the current system cannot meet the demands of large-scale military operations ... My reports were limited only to issues requiring immediate solutions, according to priorities:

After the July 2020 operations, the Prime Minister indeed asked me what the needs of the army were, to which I replied that the needs of the armed forces were formulated and recorded in the state program of modernization from 2018 to 2024, while the additional demand was included in the draft of the state program for the development of armaments and military equipment for 2020-2024, and in essence, the acquisition of necessary resources was procedural. However, it must be understood that only two months were left until the war began, and practically the issue could not be resolved.

In addition to these reports, from the very first days after assuming the position of the Chief of Staff, I proposed measures to drastically improve our relations with our strategic ally, the Russian Federation, providing a sequenced plan of specific actions. Incidentally, these proposals were accepted by him, and we began to implement planned measures, but we did not achieve serious success before the start of the war.

4. Regarding the issue of organizing defenses based on the principle of 'NO STEP BACK' as I reported in the security council meeting before the war, it should be noted that each report presented to the security council was prepared in accordance with the agenda topics of the specific meeting and cannot substantively express all issues related to the systemic challenges of security. To make objective conclusions, it is necessary to study the reports presented in discussions of various formats to form a comprehensive picture. In particular, I noted in my report that based on the operational-tactical calculations, the ratio of forces and resources in the eastern and northeast operational directions provided opportunities to conduct combat operations on the basis of the 'no step back' principle, without accounting for the factor of Turkey ... This implies the use of positional defense, where the loss of territory is considered unacceptable, and the areas of terrain and key objects are held by the utmost effort, inflicting maximum losses to the opponent. This does not mean that combat can be fought indefinitely since the capabilities of the troops are limited by the availability of fire striking means, missiles, munitions, and other material and technical supplies. In the other operational directions, the opponent had an absolute advantage in forces and resources, and under these circumstances, we had no serious opportunity even to employ maneuvering defense.

Being committed to the combat task until the end does not mean until victory, but means that we will fight in the most difficult situations with the utmost effort until the last available opportunity. I have never presented unrealistic assessments to the state leadership.

5. During the pre-war three-month period (starting from June 8, 2020, the day of my appointment), numerous planned and unplanned events were carried out to improve the troops' control system, increase the protection level of command posts, enhance the operational capabilities of command bodies, shorten the timelines for information exchange at various levels, and increase the rapid response and combat readiness of the troops based on the situation using forces and resources. For all activities, I submitted reports to the Prime Minister within the established deadlines. I should also note that I have presented a substantiated analysis regarding issues related to the preparation and conduct of the war both in the investigating bodies and in the parliamentary investigative committee.

6. I have presented the investigative committee with 11 systemic issues related to defense that contributed to the failures recorded in the 44-day war of 2020, including regarding the combat operations conducted in the direction of Shushi and several key factors. I will present only the main factors that affected the outcome of the war:
1) The neutrality and indifference of geopolitical power centers essentially legitimized the aggression, and consequently, Armenia was offered only formal approaches to political support and military assistance;
2) The absolute superiority of the opponent in quantitative and qualitative terms, including in the airspace, and the presence of numerous precision munitions in the opponent's arsenal;
3) We failed to implement the measures planned in the 2018-2024 modernization program for the armed forces and procure armaments and military equipment, which resulted in us not bringing the military power of the armed forces to the planned level. That is to say, the war started under unfavorable conditions for us.

7. I should mention that military governance is a component of the state management system, and the effectiveness of its operation directly depends on the level of the state management system. (Don’t forget that the armed forces conduct military operations, and the state leads the war). During the operations conducted in the defense sector, several omissions were made by the state management bodies that significantly affected the effectiveness of military operations, including: - The measures to ensure the legal regime of martial law were organized and implemented inadequately, resulting in our population blocking roads in many places and hindering the movement of troops stationed in the RA territory towards combat zones; - Due to the lack of effective measures to combat military crimes, a climate of impunity formed, leading to mass desertion cases from the combat zones, which significantly affected the stability of the defense system; - Due to ineffective diplomatic efforts, in a blockade situation, the logistics of providing the armed forces with the necessary quantity of missiles and ammunition was not organized effectively and regularly, which entirely negated the opportunities for the expenditure of missiles and munitions and for replenishing losses in armaments and military equipment; - Due to not imposing restrictions on internet use, the opponent succeeded in conducting psychological operations with high efficiency and influencing the moral-psychological state of the populations of RA and Artsakh, weakening their will to resist; - Due to irresponsible approaches, the initiative for the participation of private military companies and volunteers from other countries in military operations failed. At the same time, obstacles were presented in terms of financing at the initial stage and finally, with the adoption of the law on "Ratification of the International Convention for the Recruitment, Use, Financing, and Training of Mercenaries" on October 27, 2020, the process of involving a considerable number of volunteers in the war was ultimately thwarted; - Insufficient political and diplomatic efforts were made to stop the war under conditions more favorable to RA and Artsakh.

8. Explaining the circumstances regarding charges of shortcomings and omissions attributed to the command staff, I must state that no recorded fact exists in the history of wars, according to which commanders and commanding officers executed troop management perfectly. Under the complex conditions during the war, in my assessment, the commanders did their utmost to halt the advance of the opponent’s superior forces.

I find that to evaluate the performance of each level of command during the war, it is necessary to thoroughly study the factors that had a clear impact on the course and outcome of operations or battles, notably the quantitative and qualitative ratios of the forces and resources of the conflicting parties, the capabilities for restoring personnel losses, the opportunities for recovering munitions and military equipment expenditure and losses, the conformity of the normative-legal basis in supporting troops' operations during modern warfare, and the adequacy of the state management system in reacting operationally to situational changes during the conduct of the war, and so forth.

Ultimately, it must be understood whether the commander could fulfill the task under the given conditions. It is also essential to objectively clarify and clearly distinguish between the concepts of shortcoming and crime. Legal non-objective assessments will have fatal significance for both the current and future commanders of our armed forces. The nature of these assessments will determine whether we will have decisive, initiative-taking, and creative commanders or not.

9. Explaining the circumstances regarding the contradictory information presented to the Prime Minister by the President of Artsakh and myself, I must note that it is characteristic of every war for contradictory information to circulate within the management system, whereas the reality in our case was the following: The President of Artsakh, having information sources in various management levels of the Defense Army, as well as employees of the National Security Service of Artsakh, in some instances was informed earlier regarding the situation, and essentially, a "parallel" management system was created, where both the President of Artsakh and various officials and individuals with unclear authorities presented information to the Prime Minister while bypassing the command of the Defense Army. This often led to confusion, requiring additional efforts to objectively assess the situation. Incidentally, I explained to the Prime Minister that such a work format reduces the effectiveness of troop management and suggested instructing the President of Artsakh and his representatives in Artsakh to gather all information at the staff of the Defense Army. This was necessary from the perspective of providing prompt responses to the situation—that is, any information should first be received by the Commander of the Armed Forces in order to make decisions pertinent to the created situation, yet throughout the war, we routinely encountered the phenomenon of receiving contradictory data.

10. In any case, the armed forces fought for 44 days against an enemy with multiple superiority, causing them substantial losses while providing the authorities with the possibility to make political decisions.

11. Regarding the statement of the General Staff on February 25, 2021, I can state with full responsibility that I made the decision personally, assessing the military-political situation created in the region. My decisions had no connection to the official or unofficial circles of any other country, nor with any internal political forces. I also highlight that no official was subjected to pressure from my side."