The Secret of the Longevity of Cilician Armenia: Levon Ter-Petrosyan Publishes an Article

The first president of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, has published an article. According to him, as presented in one of his previous articles titled "Cilician Armenia in the Whirlwind of Geopolitical Clashes" (aliqmedia.am, newsline.am, iLur.am, 19.05.2023), the Middle East became the main stage for the conflict of four powers from the 11th to the 14th centuries: Western Europe, the Byzantine Empire, the Mongolian Khanate, and the Islamic Republic. Under these circumstances, various Christian and Muslim small states in the region had to maneuver within the conflicting interests of these empires and survive at various times as tolerated buffer zones, rebellious vassals, conquerors, or vassals themselves.

The region was a melting pot of small and large kingdoms, principalities, sultanates, and emirates, reminding one not just of a mosaic but a kaleidoscope, constantly shifting with the birth and demise of states. Notably, throughout its roughly 300 years of existence, the Cilician Armenian state had been bordered by thirteen neighbors, including the Byzantine Empire (1080-176), the Seljuk Sultanate (1077-1092), the Principality of Philaretus (1072-1090), the Principality of Vasili the Robber (1082-1117), the Danishmend Emirate (1071-1174), the Sultanate of Rum (1077-1277), the County of Edessa (1098-1150), the Principality of Antioch (1099-1268), the Zengid Atabeg of Aleppo (1150-1181), the Ayyubid Sultanate of Syria and Egypt (1181-1268), the Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt (1268-1375), the Ilkhanate of Iran (1277-1335), and the Karamanid Emirate (1277-1375).

It is clear that such variable situations made it impossible for small states to adopt long-term strategies based on political calculations. The absence of strategy was, therefore, a characteristic feature of the countries in the Middle East, including Cilician Armenia and the Crusader states, unless one considers the instinct of self-preservation and the desire to expand territories at the expense of neighbors when circumstances were favorable as a form of strategy.

In such cases, pragmatic considerations of tactical significance became primary. The long-term interests of the conflicting parties were shortsightedly subordinated to immediate gains dictated by the situation. There were no standards governing the political behavior of states. Cunningness, deceit, perjury, conspiracy, and the ability to deceive and ensnare the opponent were not only not condemned but were also seen as virtues. Violations of hospitality rules and the inviolability of ambassadors were not uncommon. The phenomenon of kidnapping and ransoming reached immense proportions. In summary, the prevailing principle in inter-state relations was the law of the jungle: whoever could seize it did so, without thinking of the consequences that could be disastrous for the captor.

The volatility of small states' political behavior was exacerbated by the fact that they often became blind tools for great powers, exploited in the plans directed against their peers. The principle of "divide and conquer" was particularly characteristic of all great powers, aiming to instigate small states against one another and thus thwart their potential cooperation. Notably, the policies of Emperor Manuel I Comnenus towards Cilicia exemplified this. In an effort to prevent the ascendance of the Rubenians, the Byzantine Empire in the 1150s incited them against first the Seljuk Sultanate of Rum and then the Principality of Antioch. Similarly, in the 1180s, the newly-formed Ayyubid Sultanate, demonstrating imperial ambitions, attempted to create a rift between Cilician Armenian authority and the Principality of Antioch.

The absence of strategic thinking and the temptation for immediate gain prevented small states from recognizing the disastrous reality of being drawn into the self-serving calculations of great powers, and they consistently fell into the same traps set by them.

Furthermore, it should be noted that even for great states, the capacity for strategic thinking alone was not a guarantee of success; what mattered was not only the presence of a strategy but also the correct choice of strategy. In illustrating this phenomenon, the example of Byzantium is perhaps most illustrative, considering its confrontation policy towards Cilician and Crusader states. According to conventional wisdom, this policy stemmed from Byzantine national interests and traditional strategy aimed at restoring the empire's authority and territorial integrity. It seemed that through the eastern campaigns of Emperors John II and Manuel I Comnenus in 1136-38, 1142-43, and 1158-59, Byzantium successfully addressed these challenges.

However, considering the subsequent developments, the question arises as to whether the tremendous efforts and vast expenses of Byzantium were justified, and whether these apparent successes were not the cause of its impending misfortunes. It is beyond doubt that the empire would have achieved much greater successes had it sought to ally with the Armenians and Franks against the Seljuk Turks instead of pitting them against one another. It is conceivable that had such a policy been employed, the history of the Middle East could have unfolded quite differently. Thus, the struggle waged by Byzantium against the Armenians and Franks was a far more unforgivable short-sightedness than even the annexation of the Great Armenian kingdoms to the empire in the early 11th century, as at that time, no one could foresee the true magnitude of the threat posed by the advancing Seljuk Turks. In contrast, Byzantium's steadfast neglect of that danger and the weakening of Christian forces in later years was nothing more than a profound indication of its complete bankruptcy in Eastern policy.

Strangely enough, contrary to medieval rhetoric and the prevailing views in modern historiography, there was also a practical absence of the consciousness of religious solidarity among the actors in Middle Eastern politics. This was a result of the aforementioned situational pragmatism, on one hand, and the doctrinal fragmentation of the conflicting camps (among Christians: Catholicism, Orthodoxy, Monophysitism; among Muslims: Sunnism, Shiism, and Ismailism) on the other. Although Christians were able, from time to time, to create an anti-Islamic front (as evidenced by volunteers from various European countries participating in the Crusades), the same was never accomplished by Muslims. Islamic countries could only fight against Christianity when one of them succeeded in conquering the others, thereby establishing a strong centralized state (e.g., Zengids, Ayyubids, Mamluks). It was much more common for disparate military-political alliances to form during wars based purely on partial considerations, regardless of the religious affiliations of the participants. A group of Christian and Muslim states often found themselves fighting against another group of similar make-up. Neither non-Muslim nor Christian states hesitated to call upon their heterodox neighbors for assistance when necessary, involving them in the fight against their co-religionists. Equally common were the abrupt collapses of hastily formed alliances, breaches of truce agreements, mutual betrayals, abductions, and plunders.

Small states were also deprived of the opportunity to benefit from stable and predictable political factors, as yesterday's ally could become an enemy the next day, or vice versa. Political factors were thus ambiguous, containing both positive and negative elements. For example, the Italian trading republics greatly contributed to the formation of the Crusader states, to their economic development, and to maintaining constant communication with Europe, yet, on the other hand, with the huge privileges they acquired and the ongoing rivalry, disputes and even incitement of civil war weakened these states.

The same applies to military-religious alliances, which, while being the mainstay of Latin Eastern defense, also, due to their ungovernable actions arising from their autonomous status and their independent disposition towards central authorities, contributed to the weakening of the Crusader states.

In this regard, the relationship between Armenians and the Crusaders was also quite ambiguous. In the initial phase, the latter inadvertently provided significant service to the Rubenians by eliminating the Turkish garrisons located in the towns of Flat Cilicia. Additionally, by establishing the County of Edessa and the Principality of Antioch, the Crusaders removed the imminent threat to Cilicia from the Muslim territories. However, by destroying the Armenian principalities of the Mesopotamia region, they later rendered those borders much more vulnerable. This phenomenon was notably characteristic not only of Christian states but also of Muslim ones. For instance, the Zengid Atabegate of Aleppo greatly benefited from the service of the Ayyubid Kurds, yet, in due course, the latter became so powerful that they destroyed their former masters. Subsequently, the Ayyubids, in turn, relying on the Mamluk armies, ultimately became their victims.

The profoundest expression of the ambiguity of factors, however, is the example of the Kingdom of Cyprus, which I have discussed in detail in the first volume of my book "Crusaders and Armenians".

The chaotic condition of the Middle East in the 11th to 14th centuries raises the question of the reasons behind the viability and longevity of small states in the region. In my view, this must be sought first in the realm of contradictions among great powers and then in the balance of forces among small states. Despite their diversity, the human, material, military, and defensive capacities of the small states were to a certain extent commensurable. Their armies' size was also approximately comparable.

These were feudal armies formed by troops provided by vassals during times of war, which, contrary to medieval chroniclers' exaggerated data, never surpassed twenty thousand, as evidenced by the more realistic counts provided by chroniclers regarding the number of participants in specific battles and campaigns. Feudal armies were capable of fighting each other on equal terms but were powerless against the imperial (Byzantine), nomadic (Seljuks and Mongols), and Mamluk regular armies. Therefore, none of the small states was truly capable of unilaterally ending the existence of another state. If a state with such intent did manage to gain allies, a counter-alliance would immediately form around its adversary, restoring the balance between the conflicting parties. Small states also exhibited an instinctive tendency to unite against any state seeking to grow at their expense.

To understand the secret of the vitality of small states, it is important to keep in mind that while wars and raids were frequent, periods of peace often lasted much longer than the years of warfare. This crucial factor provided the peoples of the region with the opportunity to restore their strengths, develop their economies, and benefit from the advantages of international trade. The awareness of the advantages of peace and the aspiration for prosperity were, at least, more emphasized among the peoples than the desire for war. Although medieval authors extolled the martial virtues and exploits of their kings or sultans, those who provided peace and welfare to their subjects were rated much higher, even if they achieved it through compromises and less advantageous agreements. For instance, John of Erzinjan writes that "It is the obligation of a ruler to… recognize the time of war and peace. For if he knows how to fight, he could also beseech angels to grant peace, for not only does it safeguard treasure, but it is the very treasure itself on behalf of which all is attempted".

Finally, one of the most important factors for the stability and viability of medieval monarchies was the presence of a clearly regulated succession rights law, which ensured the legitimate transfer of power and kept the country free from internal dynastic upheavals and external interventions. In the history of Cilician Armenia, there are no known cases where the issue of succession became the object of serious external intervention. On the contrary, at least twice the Armenian state intervened in the dynastic disputes of one of its neighbors, the Principality of Antioch. In 1160, when the Duchess of Antioch, Constance, attempted to usurp power with the support of the Byzantines, infringing upon the rights of her sixteen-year-old son, Bohemond III, her supporters turned to Lord Thoros II of Armenia for assistance. Eager to settle the dispute with the rightful heir, he rushed to Antioch. In 1216, after a prolonged struggle and numerous failed attempts, King Leon II of Armenia placed his cousin Raymond-Ruben on the throne of the Principality of Antioch.

However, in the case of Cilicia, the question of "legitimacy" of power was not limited only to the application of regulated succession law, which merely ensured the legal transfer of power within the ruling dynasty. Furthermore, the Rubenians faced two serious issues regarding their "legitimacy": the recognition of their right to rule over a territory seized from the Greeks, which ultimately became a reality due to the changing balance of power between Cilicia and Byzantium, and the legitimization of their supremacy over other Armenian princes established in Cilicia, which particularly served the reality of their kinship with King Gagik and the later fabricated legend of their royal origin.