The ‘5165 Movement’ Issues a Statement

The ‘5165 Movement’ has issued a statement calling attention to the possibilities of subjecting the executive branch to vetting within the judicial system. The observation and analysis of current political processes confirm that the principle of separation and balance of powers is more violated today than ever before, as there are no mechanisms for checks and balances between the branches of state power, and the activities of political authorities are not subject to institutional restrictions.

The assessment is based on the following considerations. First, the decisions of the primary body of power formation, the National Assembly, are predetermined from the start, as the leader of the executive branch, Nikol Pashinyan, fully controls the ruling ‘Civil Contract’ faction. Secondly, the law enforcement agencies are under the command of the Prime Minister rather than the government, often used as a lever of coercion against rival political forces and individuals, as well as to suppress manifestations of dissent within the ruling political force.

Thirdly, the ruling faction in the National Assembly has nominated an individual for the position of President of the Republic, who was a member of the government and fully shares the political goals and responsibilities of the ruling team, despite the already negligible constitutional and legal powers of the presidency. Fourthly, the political authority has vigorously embarked on the task of eliminating the independence of the judicial system, as evidenced by politically motivated changes in the composition of the Constitutional Court, blockades of courts at the Prime Minister's urging, abusive and threatening statements made by the Prime Minister and his associates against judges, the assignment of the leadership of the Supreme Judicial Council to a politically neutral person, the increased possibility of subjecting judges to disciplinary accountability within the Supreme Judicial Council, and finally, the political prosecution initiated against individual judges, notably highlighted by the case of Judge Boris Bakhshetyan's arrest.

The current authorities have long circulated the thesis that there is corruption within the Armenian judicial system that must be eradicated through judicial reforms and vetting. It is noteworthy that vetting is not conducted through systemic reforms but based on political expediency, with isolated and local solutions that contradict the positive essence of vetting and manifest clear anti-democratic characteristics. Therefore, in light of the aforementioned, we find that the actions of the authorities in this direction demonstrate that their goal is not to cleanse the judicial system of corruption and enhance its autonomy but rather to make the judicial system their appendage, which is an undeniable sign of transforming the country into a dictatorship.

However, the judicial system of Armenia, facing the danger of losing its independence entirely, responds inadequately to these dangerous trends, limiting itself to statements and not relying on institutional mechanisms. To ensure the independence of the judicial system and, consequently, to maintain a system of checks and balances, the judicial system itself must conduct vetting against the executive branch. Armenian legislation partially provides for this possibility, yet for unclear reasons, judges interested in the independence of the judiciary do not avail themselves of it. For example, according to Article 128 of the Administrative Procedure Code of Armenia, the administrative court can not only annul an obviously illegal administrative act against a citizen or entrepreneur but also make an additional decision that raises accountability issues for the official of the state body that issued the obviously illegal act.