Prosecutor General's Statement on Parliamentary Immunity Regarding the Constitutional Court's Decision

The Prosecutor General's Office of Armenia has issued a clarification regarding the ongoing discussions about parliamentary immunity following the Constitutional Court's decision on case SDO-1619.

"Considering the continuous debates surrounding the issue of parliamentary immunity prompted by the Armenian Constitutional Court's decision, and the apparent subjective manipulations by certain professional circles, we find it necessary to address the foundations of the Constitutional Court's ruling. Specifically, the stance of the Prosecutor's Office of Armenia on this matter, based on a literal interpretation of Article 96 of the Armenian Constitution and the concept of functional necessity underlying parliamentary immunity, is that the immunity of a member of the National Assembly pertains to the initiation of criminal proceedings against an individual who already possesses such status and the deprivation of that individual’s freedom. Under no circumstances does it imply that the National Assembly's consent is required to initiate criminal proceedings or to continue an already imposed restriction on freedom before obtaining parliamentary status,” the statement read.

The Constitutional Court clearly endorsed the aforementioned approach, which reflects the plain will of the Constitution, determining that the continuation of criminal proceedings against an individual initiated prior to gaining parliamentary status does not require the National Assembly's consent after obtaining their parliamentary position.

However, the Constitutional Court unpredictably exhibited an opposing stance regarding the continuation of deprivation of freedom that occurred prior to acquiring parliamentary status, stating that such continuation after obtaining this status could impede the operations of the National Assembly. This reasoning is perplexing, as it suggests that an individual previously sentenced to imprisonment for over ten years for murder or rape could run for office, gain parliamentary status, and thereby evade criminal liability.

This approach distorts the fundamental concept of functional necessity underlying parliamentary immunity. Parliamentary immunity is granted to ensure the freedom of action of a parliament member and, consequently, to exclude criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty. In simpler terms, a parliament member is immune to ensure that they are not impeded during their activities for fear of being subjected to prosecution directly or indirectly linked to their role.

Consequently, criminal proceedings initiated against an individual prior to them obtaining parliamentary status and any deprivation of their liberty should not be conditioned by their parliamentary activities, thus parliamentary immunity should not be extended to them in such cases.

In addition, the Constitutional Court's ruling poses serious risks of legal unpredictability and distortion of constitutional intent in another respect. The issues of parliamentary immunity concerning initiation of criminal proceedings and deprivation of liberty are confusedly subjected to fundamentally different interpretations in what should be identical regulatory frameworks, despite the clear constitutional provision that indicates that the will of the Constitution intends for both cases to be governed in the same manner.

It is clear from Article 96 of the Armenian Constitution that the unified will of the Constitution is that parliamentary immunity applies to both criminal prosecution and deprivation of liberty, whereas it does not extend to criminal proceedings initiated before obtaining parliamentary mandate. Nonetheless, the Constitutional Court has, in effect, subjected the unified constitutional approach to differentiated interpretation, finding that the National Assembly’s consent is not required for the continuation of criminal proceedings initiated before obtaining parliamentary status, whereas such consent is necessary for continuing the deprivation of liberty.

This interpretation raises concerns that any questions, currently subjected to clear and unambiguous constitutional regulation, may later receive unforeseeable interpretations, contradicting the unequivocal will of the Constitution.

It is also noteworthy that the Armenian Constitutional Court, in its ruling, indicated that renunciation or limitation of parliamentary immunity represents a trend observed in established and genuine democratic states. While observing the strengthening of immunity as a characteristic of undemocratic states, the Constitutional Court, through its dangerous legal interpretation, effectively strengthens this institution itself.