Aliyev Proposed Over Ten Changes at the Last Minute: Serzh Sargsyan

The third president of Armenia, Serzh Sargsyan, shared with Sputnik Armenia an authored article reflecting on the events that preceded and followed the Kazan summit a decade ago, where Armenia and Azerbaijan were just one step away from agreeing on the principles for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.

Here is an excerpt:

“Armenia has repeatedly emphasized that it is impossible to achieve a comprehensive and long-term resolution without the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh. This was reflected in the preamble of the Kazan document, which mentioned the participation of representatives from Nagorno-Karabakh in the preparation of the peace agreement draft. This clause was absent in the Madrid version. Moreover, while the November 2007 text proposed to start the work on drafting a peace agreement immediately after the fundamental principles were established by the presidents of the two countries, the Kazan version stressed that the work on the peace agreement draft would begin after the confirmation of the Fundamental Principles by all parties, including Nagorno-Karabakh. The co-chairs adhered to this approach until April 2018.

Diplomacy is a process that does not tolerate egos and populists. When Armenia's populist new leader began to declare, in May 2018, intoxicated by popular support, that he would not negotiate without the participation of Nagorno-Karabakh, the co-chairs received this with certain bewilderment. Today, when Aliyev declares that ‘there is no territorial unit called Nagorno-Karabakh,’ the Armenian authorities remain silent—tight-lipped.

The Kazan document included around thirty other changes. Undoubtedly, it was not the document of our dreams, but it could become consensus-based for both parties and the three leading states—the co-chairs of Russia, France, and the USA. It is important to emphasize that the three principles of international law presented in Madrid remained the foundation for resolution—non-use of force or threat of force, territorial integrity, and the right of peoples to self-determination.

Looking ahead, I would like to emphasize that in December 2018, on the eve of early parliamentary elections in Armenia, the new authorities embarked on an incredible adventure—sidelining the aforementioned three principles and agreeing to resolve the conflict based on the abstract ‘principle of justice,’ effectively undermining all diplomatic efforts conducted since the early 2000s, bringing us closer to the war of 2020.

In the three years leading to the Kazan summit, joint statements by the leaders of Russia, the USA, and France supporting the resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict were made in L'Aquila, Moscow, and Deauville. The five-party statement at the OSCE summit in Astana, involving the leaders of Russia, the USA, France, Armenia, and Azerbaijan, as well as three statements by the presidents of Russia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan in Mayendorf, Astrakhan, and Sochi, were all welcomed by us, and we expressed our readiness to continue negotiations based on the proposals contained therein. There were certain positive expectations among international mediators.

Who Failed the Kazan Summit?

The Kazan summit was held at the initiative of Russian President Dmitry Medvedev, while Presidents Barack Obama and Nicolas Sarkozy lent their full political weight to support the upcoming summit. A month prior, the leaders of Russia, the USA, and France issued a joint statement in Deauville on May 26, calling on Azerbaijan and Armenia to ‘finalize’ the agreement on the draft fundamental principles at the Kazan meeting, ‘preparing the peoples for peace, not for war,’ which clearly warned Baku (as well as Ankara, which was openly provoking its junior ally into confrontation). Notably, the efforts of D.A. Medvedev and S.V. Lavrov deserve special mention, as they made maximum consistent efforts to bridge the gap between the positions of the parties and find acceptable formulations.

The text presented in Kazan was practically already agreed upon between the parties, and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov noted in a letter to the foreign ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan on June 20 that, as agreed, the parties would not introduce new changes to the text of the Fundamental Principles at the upcoming meeting. President Obama urged us to approve the text presented in Kazan in phone conversations with me and I. Aliyev on June 23, and French President Nicolas Sarkozy sent us written messages on the same day.

Speaking in Strasbourg at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe before the Kazan meeting, I stated that positive results could be expected in Kazan if Azerbaijan did not propose new changes. Despite the great expectations of the international community, the Kazan summit did not succeed in achieving a breakthrough, as at the last minute, I. Aliyev proposed over ten changes to the already agreed text. This indicated a failure of the intensive work conducted over the previous three years. At Kazan, Azerbaijan effectively challenged the international community. International mediators were seriously disappointed by Baku's approach and asked Aliyev how he could, yet again, reject previously reached agreements. Such behavior did not strengthen Azerbaijan's position in the negotiation process; on the contrary.

It is no coincidence that the approaches of the co-chairs and Armenia were becoming increasingly aligned, as we have repeatedly stated. The international community and Armenia had practically begun to speak the same language—the exclusively peaceful resolution of the issue based on the international recognition and realization of the right to self-determination of the population of Nagorno-Karabakh and its security guarantees is non-negotiable.”

Read the full article by Serzh Sargsyan on the original site.