«And why hasn't the Iskander been used?» Vardan Voskanyan

In the noise surrounding the 'Iskander', when it finally became clear that it was fully operational, the main question was forgotten: 'And why hasn’t the Iskander been used?'.

At the same time, another important event went unnoticed: at the end of January, Baku and Ashgabat, with the unseen efforts of Ankara, reached an agreement by signing a memorandum concerning one of the Caspian Sea oil fields—the disputed 'Sardari' (known as 'Kapaz' in Baku)—which will now be operated jointly and will be named 'Dostluq' ('Friendship').

This field was the flashpoint of intense clashes of interest between Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan, during which the latter even closed its embassy in Baku in the early 2000s, and amid a permanent bilateral dispute, the international project of the Trans-Caspian gas pipeline, which had a clear geopolitical orientation, was also partially endangered.

In this context, the combat-ready 'Iskander' possessed by Yerevan is by no means an ordinary missile. Under the most challenging conditions, its use was meant to attempt to change the situation not only on the battlefield but also in international 'stakes', asserting that Armenia is the controlling entity upon which the safe transportation of oil and gas through the South Caucasus region depends.

Therefore, it is very important to obtain a rational answer to the question, 'And why hasn’t the Iskander been used?'