Nagorno-Karabakh: The Harbinger of Future Wars, Le Monde

Nagorno-Karabakh, a small disputed territory between Armenia and Azerbaijan, has captured the attention of several experts focused on the South Caucasus, but ultimately disappeared from the geopolitical radar as it fell into the category of frozen conflicts inherited from the collapse of the USSR. However, after the end of the war in 1994 (resulting in 30,000 casualties and tens of thousands of refugees), this mountainous region has once again witnessed clashes, the intensity and characteristics of which give military experts pause for thought, writes the French publication Le Monde.

In less than six weeks, everything changed. The fighting that began on September 27 ended (with 6,000 dead from both sides) with the defeat of Armenian forces and the signing of a ceasefire established by Moscow on November 9. The region of Nagorno-Karabakh, once conquered by Armenia in 1994, returned under Azerbaijani authority, with the newly declared independence of this Armenian enclave narrowly escaping the same fate; this scenario was only averted due to Russian intervention.

Up until that moment, it was believed that the Armenian army was more combat-ready and motivated, having a better understanding of the terrain. However, Azerbaijan, in recent years, has built an impressive military arsenal and meticulously prepared operations with the support of Turkey, a country on the brink of direct intervention. Eleven months before the outbreak of hostilities, Baku purchased $256 million worth of arms from Ankara, including six combat “Bayraktar” drones. As a result, Azerbaijan was able to leverage Turkish technological advancements and acquired expertise.

Turkish and Israeli-made drones are capable of performing almost the same tasks as military aircraft. They instilled fear among the population and caused significant human and material losses. Notably, they enabled Azerbaijan to conduct reconnaissance on Armenian positions before launching artillery strikes and blocking supply routes. Just as in Syria and Libya, Russian air defense systems proved ineffective against such small and slow-moving devices. Armenia lacked a suppression system that could disrupt drone operation and did not even deploy its Su-30 fighters, as it would have been too costly, while the loss of a drone was not of significant consequence to the enemy.

“Europe must carefully study the military lessons of this conflict and not regard it as a minor war of poor countries,” said Gustav Gressel from the European Council on Foreign Relations. “Only France and Germany have sufficient short-range suppression systems against drones, while the majority of EU militaries, particularly small and medium-sized member states, would find themselves in a complex situation similar to the Armenian army in the event of war,” the expert noted.

Military expert Michel Goya, in turn, pointed out the active use of drones, which had not previously caused such devastation in a single military campaign. “Western armies dismissed this strange flying technology, arguing that drones would not last long in high-intensity battles and that military aircraft would remain the rulers of the skies. In fact, the opposite scenario has developed,” Goya stated.

Additionally, the bloody clashes in Nagorno-Karabakh initiated a new form of psychological warfare; the presence of Syrian mercenaries deployed by Turkey created panic among the enclave's Armenian population and demonstrated to all of Ankara's adversaries that it could wield this pool of fighters at will.

Finally, the conflict in Karabakh left another mark on social networks, as images and videos of slain soldiers emerged, with some materials being sent directly to the families of the deceased. Such terror via Facebook and YouTube has never before been employed on such scales in warfare and has drawn condemnation from international humanitarian organizations and the UN. It recalls instances where groups like the