If I agreed to hand over Shushi, Azerbaijan would also want control over the Red Market-Shushi highway: Armenian Prime Minister

Recently, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan made a post on his Facebook page detailing his conversation with Russian President Vladimir Putin on October 19 and explaining why a ceasefire couldn't be reached at that time.

The post states:

On October 19, I received a call from the President of Artsakh, Arayik Harutyunyan, who said that we need to stop the war. He also mentioned that this perspective was conveyed not only from him but also on behalf of the former presidents of Nagorno-Karabakh, Arkadi Ghukasyan, Bako Sahakyan, and also by Robert Kocharyan, Serzh Sargsyan, and Levon Ter-Petrosyan.

I called Russian President Vladimir Putin, and he said that he believes it should be attempted based on Russian proposals. This means postponing the status issue, handing over the territories, and deploying Russian peacekeepers. I stated that the peacekeepers should be stationed along the former borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast and in the Lachin corridor. He agreed, and we decided that I would call again after the discussions.

I called the President of Artsakh and informed him that the possible option is as described above. He said he agrees. After that, I convened the extra-parliamentary forces and informed them that I had made such a decision. Many of their reactions were reluctant, and some posted on social media after the meeting that those who would keep the people from further struggle are traitors, etc.

On the same day, I convened a meeting of the National Security Council with representatives of the parliamentary factions present. The President of the Republic and the Supreme Patriarch were also present. The opposition reluctantly accepted the news, but I conducted the conversation in such a way that I do not intend to hold them responsible. I simply informed them so that it would not seem that I was doing something secretly behind the people's back.

I could not make any public statement because if Azerbaijan rejected the proposal after my public announcement, it would lead to the collapse of our entire resistance system. I called the Russian president again and said I agree. He said that he would discuss it with Aliyev until morning and would call back.

The next day, Bako Sahakyan and Arkadi Ghukasyan told me during our meeting that they do not agree to arrive at any agreement without clarifying the status of Artsakh or any mechanism for clarification. In essence, they also spoke on behalf of R. Kocharyan, S. Sargsyan, and L. Ter-Petrosyan.

However, all this was not essential because I had made the decision and was prepared to take it to the end. The next day, the Russian president called according to our agreement. He said that Aliyev agrees, but the peacekeepers should not be stationed along the borders of the Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, but since Hadrut and Talish are under their control, the Azerbaijanis do not agree to retreat from those front lines, and the peacekeepers should be deployed according to the actual contact line in the former Nagorno-Karabakh area. Also, the Armenian side should assume the obligation that Azerbaijanis should return to Shushi.

Thus, the ceasefire became impossible because I said that even if I agree on the Hadrut issue, I cannot imagine the possibility of handing over Shushi to Azerbaijan. The Russian president was surprised why I was against the option of Azerbaijanis returning to Shushi. When I presented my arguments, he said it was logical, and he was not well informed about certain details.

The issue was that in this case, Shushi would have had to have a population of 90% and more Azerbaijanis who would control the road to Stepanakert. I am convinced that if I had agreed to the option of handing over Shushi, Azerbaijan would have set a new condition: the Red Market-Shushi highway should be under their control. Thus, the agreement did not happen. At that time, we had lost Jebrail, Hadrut, and several nearby villages, Fizuli, and Talish. Prior to this, two humanitarian ceasefires had been declared—one on October 10, facilitated by the Russian president, and the other on October 17, facilitated by the French president. Both mediations had failed.