Nikol Pashinyan on the Loss of Shushi and Related Discussions

One of the misinformation topics is related to Shushi. Many say that Shushi has simply been surrendered. This was stated by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during an online press conference today, November 16, responding to a question about whether the demand for the surrender of Shushi was a requirement for stopping the war, who presented such a demand, and what proposals have been made by the Russian and Azerbaijani sides regarding cessation.

Pashinyan stated: “This morning, I read the post of the President of Artsakh, which states that as a result of these operations, the bodies of more than 100 of our soldiers have been found in Shushi. If Shushi has been surrendered, under whose command did those soldiers fight or what did they fight for? Furthermore, I want to say that there have been claims from political platforms that there are specific data, names that are ready to testify that a treacherous decision regarding Shushi has been made. I want to inform that the law enforcement bodies have summoned the author of that statement and tried to obtain specific information from him about who the traitors are, what conspiracy is being discussed, and how it has happened. As far as I know, the author of that statement has avoided giving specific answers. The conclusion here is this: if there is treachery and someone claims to have concrete information about treachery and then refuses to provide specific information, it in fact indicates involvement in treachery. If anyone says that they do not trust the law enforcement bodies and therefore do not make a statement, let them make a public statement about who made that statement and what actually happened. And in reality, what has happened is what has been officially announced. Unfortunately, yes, first through diversionary groups, then continuously through other groups, there was an infiltration into the city, and unfortunately, we lost Shushi.”

He also added: “I have spoken about a nuance during the war and brought the example of 2011, that every time a compromise option became acceptable to the Armenian side, that same option became unacceptable to Azerbaijan at that moment. It is very important to understand whether we could have avoided the war. Yes, we could have if we had agreed to surrender 7 regions including Shushi to Azerbaijan. But was that the policy we wanted to pursue? No, it was not. The Artsakh Defense Army, the Armenian government, and our armed forces decided to accept the challenge that was thrown to Armenia. Unfortunately, that did not lead to the results we would have liked. But also because the discourse of the inevitability of defeat has been present on the front line from day one. Political figures who called for relinquishing territories to stop the war from the first days of the war now accuse the Armenian government of treachery for the same thing. Now the difference between early and late is not substantial. Yes, the condition for the surrender of Shushi was presented, if not from the very beginning, then in the initial stages. Why did we, the Artsakh authorities, go down this path? As long as there was at least a theoretical opportunity to defend everything, the Defense Army and the General Staff of the Armed Forces decided to fight until the end, and they heroically fought until the last moment. But unfortunately, we could not solve that problem. Yes, we are responsible for it because over the last 2.5 years we have not been able to fill in what was not done for decades. Therefore, yes, we are responsible.”

Pashinyan denied the claims that Russian peacekeepers were being transferred to Armenia days before the fall of Shushi: “Such a thing does not exist, that is absolutely baseless information. Peacekeepers began to be transferred after the signing of the statement.”

When asked whether it is true that various documents were presented to your office during different stages of the war, which, according to some people's claims, were all more favorable than the November 9 statement, Nikol Pashinyan replied: “Regarding the various documents, such a thing did not happen. There has been the same logic of cessation of hostilities as there was before the start of the war, that these territories must be surrendered to Azerbaijan, including Shushi, and without any status. It has been like this since before the war. It has been so since 2016, and the April War was the last bell in this story. With the difference that this time it was already impossible to stop the war with any verbal statement or obligation. What was our biggest mistake? Since 1998, there has been only one subject in the negotiation content that has been very specific and measurable. That is, that the territories must be surrendered to Azerbaijan. Our policy has been to stretch this process, to buy time. Yes, time can be stretched for one year, 5 years, 10 years, 15-20 years. Yes, the rubber can be stretched 4 meters, 5 meters, but at some X point that rubber will break. That rubber was already torn by the April War of 2016. When I said a new point, I meant that we should try to get out of that torn rubber logic and to take ourselves out of it. We have not succeeded in doing that. When that has not been succeeded, and the military threat has been brought to the forefront, we have done everything in this short time... I am not saying that everything possible has been done, but that has been our focus, and the July 2020 events showed that we were ready for war with Azerbaijan. But later mercenary terrorists were engaged in large numbers and Turkey. This became the reason for our failure. Could we have prevented such developments? Yes, if we agreed to surrender those regions without the status of Artsakh. We decided to try to resist and as a result obtain more favorable conditions. During that struggle, many forces that are now accusing us of treachery told us that we should surrender. We were saying no, we will not surrender as long as there is at least one percent theoretical, practical opportunity for the Defense Army to fight and resolve some issue with it. When we recorded that there was no such opportunity, we went the other way. Moreover, we practically lost nothing through this because if we had not done that, we would have lost anyway and 25-30 thousand soldiers would have found themselves surrounded.