Nikol Pashinyan's Team Is Not Levon Ter-Petrosyan's Team: Levon Zurabyan's Interview with Turan az

“The claims that Nikol Pashinyan's team, which came to power in Armenia, is Levon Ter-Petrosyan's team are incorrect. Today, they are separate, independent political forces that were on opposite sides of the barricades back in 2008.” This was stated by Levon Zurabyan, former MP and vice president of the Armenian National Congress, in an interview with the Azerbaijani Turan az, as reported by irakanum.am.

As a reminder, the editor of that media outlet had visited Armenia.

We present the literal translation of the interview in full.

– What is Pashinyan's government program?

– We will start comparing, criticizing, or supporting it when we see their program. Since coming to power, Pashinyan's team has been more engaged in political struggle than in state affairs because the parliament was mainly composed of representatives of the old regime. In such a dual power situation, discussing a program is unnecessary. Now, having obtained a parliamentary majority, Pashinyan has the opportunity to present a program and act. Only then will we evaluate it.

– What were the reasons for starting the “velvet revolution” and the secret of Pashinyan's team’s success?

– No people in the world likes corruption or restrictions on freedom. Everyone wants democracy and equal opportunities. That was exactly what Armenia lacked. That was the reason for the protests and the “velvet revolution.” What we dislike is expressed through rallies, and these are peaceful demonstrations, except for March 1, 2008. At that time, for the first time in Armenia's history, the authorities used force against their own people. The last change of power confirmed that the people did not accept that and went out into the streets, as they did in March 2008.

– What was the reason for the criminal prosecution against former President Robert Kocharian and the military leadership of Armenia?

– That is Armenia's internal affair. I would not want to discuss that topic with the Azerbaijani media. A process of “healing” is underway in Armenia, which should demonstrate that no state officials or politicians should cross a certain threshold.

– How justified are the claims that there is a conflict or contradiction between the residents of Yerevan and those from Artsakh?

– There is no conflict. This topic is exploited by certain individuals for their political purposes. People in Armenia and Artsakh understand that these are meaningless discussions.

– How relevant are Levon Ter-Petrosyan’s thoughts expressed in his famous 1997 article “War or Peace: The Time to Get Serious” today?

– They remain relevant today, but the world has changed. The understanding of Armenia's strategic interests at that time was correct, but the situation is different now; the geopolitical situation has changed, primarily due to the escalation of the “cold war” between the West and Russia.

– Does this mean that the situation in Armenia has worsened?

– The situation has deteriorated not only in Armenia but also in Azerbaijan (he did not elaborate on what has specifically worsened – ed.).

– What do you mean?

– Many in Azerbaijan perceive the status quo as a problem that cannot be solved.

– Is there a fear in Armenia that in the event of a new war, the occupied territories could be lost? Would it not be better to come to an agreement now and gain something in return?

– The aforementioned article states that in the event of a new war, Azerbaijan could lose new territories and should not think that it will win. It must be prepared for compromises. Azerbaijan must realize that without that, nothing is possible.

– In 1997, Ter-Petrosyan's government accepted a phased settlement plan. Is such a program possible today?

– This document states that three sides must agree—Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh—that the status of Karabakh should be determined through negotiations. The 1997 variant actually meant international recognition for Nagorno-Karabakh. At that time, the option was beneficial for Armenia and Azerbaijan, but not for Nagorno-Karabakh.

– Can we call that a missed opportunity for resolution?

– Yes.

– What was the reason for Nagorno-Karabakh's refusal of that option?

– Karabakh approaches this issue as a matter of self-determination. We have never spoken about territorial claims against Azerbaijan. Ter-Petrosyan's formula was: “What is beneficial for Azerbaijan and Karabakh is also beneficial for Armenia.” For instance, Scotland. Some forces want independence, and London is negotiating with them. Unfortunately, Baku does not follow the path of dialogue.

– What should Baku do in this case?

– Any central authority must present important conditions to the regions it considers its own: security, rights of democracy, and civil rights. If that happened, and if the residents of Karabakh knew they could live peacefully and develop, why would they separate? Now the people of Karabakh believe they have no place in Azerbaijan.

– How do you explain the reaction of Armenia and Karabakh to the sensational statement by the former US ambassador to Armenia, Richard Mills?

– Official authorities of Armenia have not expressed an opinion, and as far as maximalists are concerned, such nationalists exist everywhere, just as in Azerbaijan. For Karabakh residents to return, Azerbaijan must change. If you are not recognized, it is your task to convince and gain trust. If assistance was not accepted, then they were not convincing enough. The 400 million rubles that Gorbachev provided for socio-economic development were actually given to Azerbaijan, not to Karabakh (referring to the 1988 socio-economic development program for Karabakh – ed.). Moreover, Baku utilized it for the development of Azerbaijani settlements.

– Why did Armenia abandon the idea of constructing a pipeline through its territory?

– The idea was rejected because the Armenian side was unable to elevate this issue above the resolution process. Even if Ter-Petrosyan had remained in power, that project would not have been implemented. Even today, it is not too late to take certain steps—open roads, regulate communication with the residents of Karabakh.

There are also external participants in conflict resolution. The settlement of the conflict is not limited to the agreement of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Nagorno-Karabakh. The decision must also meet the interests of the great powers. However, it is hard to say how effectively the OSCE is achieving success in this matter. They express a unified position in words, but different processes are underway behind the scenes.

– What can we expect in the near future in Armenian-Azerbaijani relations?

– Nothing good. I do not see any real progress in the resolution. The main issue is the lack of trust, and that is why any concession becomes dangerous. Decisive steps are needed—opening borders, direct communication. Agreement must be reached. What hinders Ilham Aliyev from meeting with Bako Sahakyan? After all, you consider the residents of Karabakh your citizens. Negotiate with your citizens. Perhaps you will not agree today on the status, but you can agree on preliminary status, some guarantees. Perhaps in this way, you will convince the residents of Karabakh that they are the architects of their own fate. It is true that Azerbaijanis may say: “Today they want this, tomorrow they will want more, but there is no alternative.”