Can Iran and Azerbaijan Avoid Renewed Tensions? What International Media Reports

Although the tensions that gripped Iran and Azerbaijan in the fall of 2021 have now eased, the underlying disputes remain unresolved. This suggests that their rapprochement may be short-lived, writes Adam Lammons in National Interest.

“Accepting the possibility of future conflict requires a reassessment of the post-2020 Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict around Nagorno-Karabakh. After forty-four days of fighting, Azerbaijani forces reclaimed significant portions of Nagorno-Karabakh from Armenia, giving Azerbaijan full control over its former border with Iran, thanks to Turkey’s decisive military support and Israeli weaponry. The ceasefire brokered by Russia legitimized a new status quo to Iran’s detriment.”

“Of course, Iran's impotence was fully manifested throughout the war, during which artillery fire rained down on Iranian territory, as militants ignored Tehran's calls for a ceasefire and proposals for mediation. Additionally, as Iran's strategic regional partner, Armenia faced attacks from Azerbaijan and Turkey, Tehran supported Baku's right to 'liberate' 'occupied' territories, a calculated step aimed at suppressing Azerbaijani nationalism within Iran.”

“However, Azerbaijan's subsequent victory only whetted its appetite. On February 6, 2021, Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev demanded for control over Armenia's southeastern Syunik region and threatened to open a corridor through it using force. This transport route, known as the Zangezur Corridor, links Azerbaijan to its western exclave, Nakhchivan, through Armenian territory, representing a long-awaited objective for both Azerbaijan and Turkey.”

“In June 2021, Aliyev and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan signed the Shusha Declaration on Allied Relations between the Republic of Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey, a political and economic roadmap that solidified their alliance with mutual defense agreements and a commitment to build the Zangezur Corridor. This corridor connecting all of Azerbaijan would enable access to the European Union, Turkey, and Central Asia through the Caspian Sea, furthering Turkey's aim of uniting the Turkic world and making Azerbaijan a potential priority vector for China's 'One Belt, One Road' initiative.”

“This stance raises alarm in Iran. Efforts to impose a weakened Armenia with the Zangezur Corridor would cross Tehran’s red line against the violent alteration of international borders while significantly increasing Turkey's regional influence. Indeed, Iran is closely monitoring the developing political and defense ties between Azerbaijan and Turkey. The two neighbors, often referred to as 'one nation, two states,' are bolstering Azerbaijani military capabilities through large-scale drills, joint exercises, and arms sales, resulting in what Aliyev described as a 'smaller version of the Turkish army.' Iran witnessed the results of this alliance during the 2020 conflict, where Turkey's provision of advanced drones and Syrian mercenaries helped Azerbaijan defeat Armenian ground forces.”

“Furthermore, despite recent reconciliation efforts between Azerbaijan and Iran, some analysts warn that Azerbaijan's reunification could encircle Iran with a 'Turkish arc' that would eliminate Baku’s dependence on Tehran and condition Iran's entry into the South Caucasus on Turkey and Azerbaijan's silent accord. But the consequences are far from clear. Fuad Chiragov notes that Iran's economic integration projects with Azerbaijan blunt the prospects of fierce geopolitical competition. Nonetheless, today's integration policies could become a source of leverage tomorrow as tensions escalate. Transport links that once kept the countries together could be abruptly severed, just as dependence on foreign energy resources can transform into weaponry.

“This changing regional dynamic explains why tensions flared again in the fall of 2021. On September 12, 2021, the same day Azerbaijan, Turkey, and Pakistan launched the 'Three Brothers 2021' military exercises in the Caspian Sea, near the Iranian border with Azerbaijan, authorities began charging Iranian vehicles with 'toll fees' and detained two Iranians for entering Nagorno-Karabakh. Subsequently, on October 1, 2021, the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) began unprecedented military exercises along the border with Azerbaijan. Iran’s war games were not solely a response to border disputes. Iranian officials have explicitly stated that the IRGC's 'Conquerors of Haibar' exercises were a reaction to the increasing Israeli influence in Azerbaijan, although they also declared that threats to their sovereign borders and the presence of Syrian 'terrorists' in Azerbaijan had also provoked IRGC operations.”

“Of course, Iran has reasons to feel paranoid concerning Azerbaijan's strategic partnership with Israel. In particular, Iran is not only concerned about the billions of dollars Azerbaijan is spending on advanced Israeli military technology but also about Israeli military and intelligence assets operating from Azerbaijani territory. It is no surprise that Baku’s denials and its efforts to downplay its close ties with Israel have failed to reassure Tehran's officials. Iranians are well aware that their intelligence and security services have struggled for years to rein in effective campaigns of assassinations and diversions widely attributed to Israel, which has targeted their nuclear facilities and scientists. Additionally, Israeli intelligence assisted the U.S. in the assassination of Qassem Soleimani. It is evident that Israel has no trouble penetrating Iran and Iranian officials are determined to prevent this.”

“Considering Turkey's decision to send Syrian mercenaries (whom Iran's former president Hassan Rouhani referred to as 'terrorists that Iran has been battling for years') to fight alongside Azerbaijan in the 2020 Nagorno-Karabakh war, Iranian officials have grounds to believe that regional wars are encroaching upon their territory. Tehran's advanced defensive doctrine aims to engage Iran’s adversaries outside its borders (in places such as Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen), but this comes at a cost. First, as Borzou Daragahi notes, Iran’s focus on competition with the U.S., Israel, and Saudi Arabia has led to insufficient investment in diplomatic and intelligence capabilities in the Caucasus, creating a 'blind spot' that rendered it a bystander in the 2020 conflict. Second, Iran’s efforts to encircle Israel in Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza have prompted Israel to normalize relations with Iran's neighbors through the 'Abraham Accords,' an initiative reportedly including Azerbaijan. 'Tehran is clearly feeling the pressure from Israel's encirclement strategy,' wrote Alex Vatanka, director of the Iran Program at the Middle East Institute, last October. 'In its history, Israel has never had such diplomatic, economic, and military-intelligence relations with countries bordering Iran.'”

“Now, with Israel closing in and other hostile elements stationed right across the border, Tehran is safeguarding itself against future conflict. This maneuvering explains why the IRGC's Quds Force, which leads armed movements in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, Yemen, and Afghanistan, has recently activated the 'Hosseiniyun' Brigade in predominantly Shia Azerbaijan. While little is known about these groups' numbers and capabilities, they could serve as sleeper cells in the event of renewed military operations with Azerbaijan or even act as a deterrent against Azerbaijani officials stoking nationalist sentiments against Iranian citizens of Azerbaijani or Turkic descent.”

“All of this indicates that the sources of tension between Iran and Azerbaijan are profound, and that despite their recent rapprochement, new aggression could emerge in the near future.”