"Corridor Against Corridor"... the New War is Just to Justify Upcoming Possible Losses and Concessions: Armen Gevorgyan

Thus, many things became extremely clear and open. It was necessary to reach Brussels for this. Essentially, the discussions around communications are on the level of political expediency, not pragmatism or economic benefits. This was written by Armen Gevorgyan, the Chairman of the RA National Assembly’s Committee on Regional and Eurasian Integration.

This is also normal, but at the same time, there must be a clear understanding of who is paying for what and with what. If the communication solutions do not bring economic benefits to at least one of the parties, then they only acquire political significance. The Armenian side began to more frequently mention the discussed project of the railway connection from Eraskh to Ordubad, Meghri, Baku, and Russia in the context of entering the Iranian railway, rather than the context of favorable transit to Russia.

At the same time, we must understand that in the absence of a resolution to the Nagorno-Karabakh issue and new, independent, more optimal routes of communication with Iran (railway, new high-speed highways, etc.), we again find ourselves dependent on Azerbaijan’s whims, which can always halt transportation through its territory from Armenia. We can discuss the unblocking of communications with Azerbaijan, but we must intensively and simultaneously advance our communication agenda within the North-South framework.

The "corridor against corridor" formula is fundamentally flawed and unacceptable, as it will completely remove the conflicting parties from the global political resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh issue, where the most important issue is the right to self-determination of the people of Artsakh and the final status of the Republic of Artsakh. Let me remind you of the three main components of the resolution: status, a strong connection to Armenia, and guarantees of security for the population.

And, then, the issue of the corridor already relates to Armenia itself, its territorial integrity, and sovereignty. But today’s reality is that the future resolution of the Artsakh issue largely no longer falls within the authority of the Armenian authorities, and all primary resources are now concentrated in the hands of Russia. Judging by the course of negotiations, the Transnistrian model seems to be the most optimal Russian exit from the created situation. This means leaving the political resolution of the conflict to the judgment of future generations, while in the meantime establishing dialogue and cooperation between the conflicting parties and maintaining the population of Artsakh as much as possible, which needs to be protected by peacekeepers.

The potential visible outcome of a long-term status quo will be the "Russification" of Artsakh, the political endpoint of which will become the Russian protectorate. It is clear that the Turkic coalition will resist this prospect.

We must be prepared for the possibility that soon we may find out that we will have to concede several territories according to Azerbaijan’s notions within the framework of delimitation and demarcation of state borders.

As long as it is not understood that the consistent policy of reducing the historical area of residence of Armenians in the South Caucasus and their number is being globally implemented as the so-called optimal solution to the Armenian question, we will only lose and be defeated. We must realize that the decisions made today will shape the history and prospects of our people and state not for years, but for the coming decades. It will be very difficult to change them later, if at all possible. Decision-makers must understand that the responsibility for these will not be limited to the term of office of the current government or political majority.

Such decisions and responsibilities do not have a historical expiration date and are difficult to erase from national memory. In this context, it is important to be cautious about the agenda of peace and cooperation in the region, which can minimize the historically conditioned threats to the security of the Armenian people in public consciousness and, therefore, the need for its assurance by allies or other countries, meaning Russia’s role.

And, by the way, regarding a possible new war. It is clear that this issue is merely to justify the upcoming possible losses and concessions. Now, a war is not beneficial for anyone except Armenia, but also for Russia. For Russia, a new war would be an unavoidable fulfillment of allied obligations within the framework of bilateral relations and the CSTO. It is also the first line of contact in Artsakh.

Such a war would be an inevitable loss for Russia in terms of its arbiter status, its prospects for involvement in integration projects, and for Armenia as its ally. The failure to fulfill obligations would provide the basis for a sharp rise in anti-Russian sentiments and the unavoidable repetition of the Georgian scenario of pushing Russia out of Armenia. For anti-Russian circles, this will also be an ongoing topic: who ultimately surrendered Karabakh?

At the same time, there will be no issues related to gas, as Azerbaijan will already provide it. Armenians will actively trade with the Turks, import cheap gasoline, eat Turkish tomatoes and mandarins. We will be promised substantial profits from oil and gas transit. And this prospect may secretly attract many residents of our country who will probably not evolve from mercantile mortals into patriotic citizens in the coming years. And many of them are not concerned with whether they will live in a dignified and independent state and therefore subconsciously vote solely for the invisible prospect of their own welfare. Meanwhile, the vast majority sit at home waiting for their desired leader to appear. And he has not yet appeared, as it is very different for everyone.