I Regret That These Simple Truths Were Not Understood by Some of My Colleagues in Time: Levon Ter-Petrosyan

In my speeches, interviews, and publications, I have repeatedly expressed the idea that "the key to resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh issue is in the hands of Russia," which has been perceived with astonishment or anger by political forces, expert circles, and the ruling authorities alike. Given the current relevance of the issue, I do not consider it excessive to remind readers of my views published at the time, while also apologizing for making extensive quotes, as mentioned in the article by the first President of Armenia, Levon Ter-Petrosyan, published on Ilur.am.

"Unlike the West, for Russia, the South Caucasus has been and remains a sphere of vital interests, and it is naivety to think that it will ever abandon the course of defending those interests. The West's aforementioned passivity is also partly explained by the fact that it subconsciously views the region as an area of Russian influence. If not the United States, then at least many of the EU countries have somehow reconciled themselves to this idea and are clearly not intending to intervene actively in the affairs of the South Caucasus. This means that the key to resolving the Karabakh conflict, and perhaps even the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, is in the hands of Russia. Therefore, regardless of its preferences, any government of Armenia must seek solutions to these vital problems within this geopolitical context. Such behavior is connected not with desires or intentions, but exclusively with an awareness of reality and the imperatives of political realism. The Armenian authorities, in my impression, do not yet realize this. Meanwhile, Turkey and Azerbaijan clearly assess the reality more accurately, as evidenced by the recent active contacts of those countries with Russia. Thus, we have found ourselves in a situation reminiscent of that in 1920, from which, unfortunately, we did not find the right way out at the time. We cannot afford to make the same mistake again today," (Speech at the 16th Congress of the Armenian National Congress, July 17, 2010).

"Afghanistan, Israel, Iran, and the economic crisis are such heavy burdens for the West that leave no room for it to think about Karabakh and, in general, the South Caucasus. ... Unlike the West, for Russia, the South Caucasus has been and remains a sphere of vital interests, and it is naivety to think that it will ever abandon the course of defending those interests. ... This means that the key to resolving the Karabakh conflict, and possibly the normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations, is in the hands of Russia. Therefore, regardless of its preferences, any government of Armenia must seek solutions to these vital problems within this geopolitical context. Undoubtedly, the extension of the operation period of the Russian military base deployed in Armenia and the sale of S-300 missile systems to Azerbaijan further strengthen Russia's positions in the South Caucasus and greatly increase its role in the process of resolving the Karabakh conflict. In light of these recent events, it has become blatantly clear that no matter how much Russia agrees to the principles and plans developed by the Minsk Group, it will never allow the deployment of international peacekeeping forces in the conflict zone, let alone reconcile itself with the fact of any form of NATO presence in the South Caucasus. These reflections should not be regarded as expressions of pro-Russian sentiment or anti-Western attitudes, as some have perceived or tried to portray, but rather as a simple acknowledgment of reality, which is not connected to anyone's wishes or political orientation. Unfortunately, according to my information, instead of making correct conclusions from this reality, the Armenian authorities are trying to reap temporary benefits and connect everything to orientations. ... I must also touch upon the significant event that went unnoticed by political analysts, which occurred two weeks ago in Baku. I refer to the unequivocal statement made by Presidents Medvedev and Aliyev that Russia and Azerbaijan are now strategic partners. Although similar words have been spoken before, it is the first time that concrete content is given to them. This means that what I forecasted back on January 8, 1998, during my speech at the National Security Council meeting has come to fruition; specifically, I stated that I do not exclude, but rather consider it extremely natural and likely that, given the issues related to the exploitation of Caspian oil and the construction of pipelines, Russia will undertake serious efforts to establish normal relations with Azerbaijan, and in that case, Armenia would lose its advantage of being Russia's only ally or strategic partner in the South Caucasus" (LTP, Selected Works, p. 658).

The consequences of the strategic partnership between Russia and Azerbaijan for Armenia and Karabakh can hardly be difficult to imagine. Thus, all signs indicate that the emergence of a new Russian-Turkish-Azerbaijani format in the Nagorno-Karabakh resolution process is becoming a fact. This does not mean, of course, that it will replace the Minsk Group, which, in my opinion, will continue to exist, if only to create an impression of coordinating international efforts and not provoke the West unnecessarily. Meanwhile, the actual processes will occur in the new format, which is what led me to compare the current situation with that of 1920 in my previous remarks. ... The entire attention of the Armenian people should be focused on the dangers hanging over Karabakh and Armenia in this worrying situation, as, like in 1920, we face the threat of imposed solutions" (Speech at the rally on September 17, 2010).

The resolution of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict that Armenia can currently achieve with maximum efforts would have been possible under much more favorable conditions as far back as 1998. Had that occurred, we would not only have avoided the unnecessary sufferings and losses of the past eighteen years but would also have had a flourishing, populous, developing country and secure Karabakh today. I regret that these simple truths were not understood in time by some of my colleagues, and we lost the most favorable moment for resolving the issue. I hope that this assertion will not be perceived as reproach directed at anyone, but rather as a warning that if we waste time again, in the future we will have to resolve the issue under worse conditions and in a much weaker position. The disastrous consequences of the 1998 regime change must not be sought in the changes in the personalities involved but rather in the disruption of the continuity of policies. Putting the past aside, it is obvious that today we are once again faced with the imperative of not missing the next moment for resolving the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, as evidenced, in particular, by the serious efforts Russia has exerted in this direction recently. I have previously stated that the key to resolving the Karabakh issue is in the hands of Russia, and its current efforts are proving the truth of this assertion. Moreover, the West, which, as mentioned, does not prioritize the Karabakh settlement, is undoubtedly not only aware of but also appreciates Russia's special role in this matter. The Armenian National Congress, like its predecessor, the Armenian National Movement, is the only party in Armenia that has never hidden and has repeatedly publicly declared its commitment to being a partner for compromise and peace. Therefore, not only from a principled standpoint, but also dictated by the situation, the Congress must participate in the upcoming parliamentary elections with a constructive program aimed at stopping the arms race, excluding the danger of a new war, resolving the Karabakh issue, and normalizing relations with Turkey, which stems not from our party's interests but from the vital interests of the people of Armenia and Karabakh. This program is, of course, achievable only in the case of the Congress's victory in the elections or having a considerable presence in the National Assembly" (Speech at the Congress of the Armenian National Congress, December 17, 2016).

In the post-congress debate, my statement that "the key to the resolution of the Karabakh issue is in the hands of Russia" has also become a subject of vigorous discussion. This obvious truth, devoid of elements of sympathy or antipathy towards Russia and unrelated to foreign policy orientation, has given rise to geopolitical misinterpretations of such a nature that addressing them would simply signify acting unseriously. The basis of my assertion regarding the key to resolving the Karabakh issue is rooted in the following undeniable facts. Unlike Russia, the Karabakh issue has never been a priority for the West, as evidenced by the fact that it has, apart from official statements and diplomatic initiatives, undertaken no practical steps in that direction. The ceasefires between Azerbaijan and Karabakh in both 1994 and 2016 were concluded exclusively through Russian efforts. Actively being engaged in the maelstrom of Middle Eastern events amid the ongoing cold war, Russia cannot tolerate such a volatile flashpoint as the Karabakh conflict in its immediate vicinity. That is why, recently, the initiative for resolving that conflict has passed into Russia's hands, a fact that is also understood by the West. Again, unlike the West, it is Russia that possesses effective levers to influence the authorities of Azerbaijan and Armenia and reach an agreement between them—a fact that has also been emphasized repeatedly by Western analysts. As I noted in one of my articles a year ago, "We are by no means speaking about Russia imposing some new plan for the resolution of the Karabakh issue, but rather about revitalizing a program based on the Madrid principles formulated with the Minsk Group's co-presidency" (iLur.am, December 28, 2016).

Finally, I find it fitting to draw the reader's attention to the extensive and insightful article recently published by Richard Hoagland, the former American co-chair of the Minsk Group, which confirms my aforementioned assertions: "When the so-called Lavrov Plan was released, I asked my excellent colleague, the Russian Co-Chair Ambassador Popov, if the Kremlin would really agree to implement it, should Yerevan and Baku buckle and accept it. His candid reply? 'Of course not.' More than anything else, this made clear to me that Nagorno-Karabakh is not just a bilateral problem between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In reality, it’s a trilateral issue with Russia playing a key, perhaps even decisive, role." In my opinion, one of the main reasons for the tragedy we are destined to face in the Karabakh issue has been the failure of the previous two and current governments to recognize or acknowledge this reality. Had this merely been a historical acknowledgment, I would not consider it necessary to address it again. Unfortunately, even today, almost all political circles and state institutions, particularly members of the Government and especially the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, are making clear statements regarding their hopes to reconnect the solution of the Karabakh issue with the Minsk Group. This trend is fraught with new disappointments awaiting us, if not heavy losses.