On the Morning of September 27, Armenian Side Lost 50% of Its Air Defense Forces and 40% of Its Artillery in 15 Minutes: Samvel Babayan's Revelations from the 44-Day War

Former Secretary of the Security Council of Artsakh (2020) and former commander of the Defense Army (1993-99) Samvel Babayan gave an extensive interview to the 'Meronk' website, discussing the course, failed operations, and shortcomings of the 44-day war. Babayan suggests launching criminal cases regarding the course of the war and starting an investigation. CivilNet has highlighted several key points from the interview.

About the Pre-War Situation
We were trying to clarify through the Security Council whether the enemy has the capabilities that I know of or even more. We attempted to address this issue and sent a letter to the Defense Army. The Defense Army stated that we needed to turn to the Minister of Defense of Armenia. I called the Minister of Defense David Tonoyan, and he responded evasively, saying, 'it's a secret, you know.'

We wanted to clarify information about weapons and units, but they made it clear that they could not provide that data. Secondly, we could not go to the positions. The Security Council is a consultative body, but without information about the enemy, we had to prepare a plan. David Tonoyan said he would come to Artsakh, and when he arrived, we would discuss this matter. Later it became clear that he came and left without any discussion. I understood that they were trying to obstruct the process.

About Reserves
Artsakh needed to gather 17,500 reserve resources, with 7,500-8,000 in the first phase. The first phase was 90% completed. After that, nothing was done because the state should have been immediately placed on wartime footing, which did not happen, and secondly, there was free movement, people could come and go as they pleased. I told this to the Prime Minister of Armenia and the President of Artsakh. Armenia, which was supposed to provide 11,000 reserve resources, only managed to deliver 6,000-7,000, most of which also could not perform their tasks.

When the troops see that we cannot suppress the enemy's UAVs and artillery, fear enters their ranks. The unit commanders are also unable to carry out their tasks because their capabilities are not suited for commanding 4,000 troops; their capabilities are to command 2,000. The commander of the Artsakh Defense Army Jalal Harutyunyan was forced to appoint a 19-year-old lieutenant as a platoon commander. A soldier flees, failing to perform their duties or is not present. This speaks to a ten-year policy on personnel management. Jalal Harutyunyan can confirm this. The troops were fed lies; now generals are stating 'I'm not guilty, someone else is guilty.' In the last ten years, whoever has been the chief of staff, commander, they are all responsible.

The military commissariats, when sending reserves to Jabrayil, didn't they understand that there should have been many who served in that resource, it needed to be organized properly? Let there be a sincere investigation, so our society clearly understands what happened.

Start of the War
On the morning of September 27, the Armenian side lost 50% of its air defense forces and 40% of its artillery in just 15 minutes. The enemy had satellites that were monitoring and armed UAVs. This happened in 15-20 minutes. If the Armenian side loses 40% of its artillery, that is a significant disaster, and 50% of the air defense forces is equally catastrophic.

In 2016, when I explained that the enemy's missiles and artillery would rain down like hail on children, this began in two main directions: Talish-Mataghis and Horadiz. Four to five days later, the enemy breaks through the southern direction, expanding in four to five directions. Now, while generals are blaming each other and politicizing the matter, this is familiar to me from 1992, when they lose, everyone is guilty, and they are traitors.

About the Southern Line's Failure
In the south, after the enemy broke through 9-11 kilometers, they extended the overall frontline from 270 kilometers to 470 kilometers. We also did not have the resources to seal it. I suggested creating a command post in the south and proposed that Mosin Movses Hakobyan, former commander of the Defense Army (2007-15), Chief of General Staff of the RA Armed Forces (2016-18), go in that direction. Later he indicated that he had personal problems and did not do it. This person was the chief of staff, he knows the first, second, and fifth corps; he knows the personnel of the units, I do not. Two years ago he was there. The general-lieutenant stated, ‘I have personal old problems, I am not going.’ Now let's understand why he is not going—he knows his troops, his appointees, their capabilities. The person under that rank refuses to carry out that command.

Now I’m asking, if the commander of the Defense Army for eight years, and the chief of staff for four years refuse to carry out an issue dependent on them, then what do you expect from a junior officer or battalion commander? They also refused; this situation has resulted from this refusal. And that person received no punishment—‘I didn't want to, that’s it.’ A general talks about ‘Iskander’ hitting here, hitting there, or someone coming to headquarters, and I said this and that.

Samvel Babayan's Proposal
When the enemy breaks through and reaches Jabrayil, expanding towards Khudaferin, I suggested closing the road near Kyant-Horadiz to cut off the enemy. I personally proposed this to Jalal Harutyunyan, and Jalal himself participated in this; two brigades were formed. By closing that road, we wouldn't have the current situation; we would cut off their supplies. During the operation, two tank brigades would enter and move forward, covering each other.

When our troops advanced, the Azerbaijanis stood by our tanks with flags, not realizing they were our tanks. Azerbaijan suffered 150 casualties there; they were crushed. But the second brigade did not even try to advance, did not fortify— the commander was wounded in the leg, and the deputy did not follow orders, and so on. I could not plan the operation; I can give the idea.

The investigation should clarify why both brigades failed to fulfill their missions and who is responsible. You enter the battle with artillery support; everything is normal, but you do not execute the order. If that operation had happened, we wouldn't have had 2,000 casualties; we wouldn’t have lost those territories. Jalal Harutyunyan specifically explained to them on the map—they change the war situation or remain in this state. Let our society know why that did not happen... I say the words of the commander of the Defense Army: for three hours, the enemy did not understand what was happening. We should have gone, set up, and fortified. Why did it not occur?

Fall of Shushi
In the village of Sghnakh, the Azerbaijanis established a base that extended towards Shushi. There were three battalions—three from Armenia and one from Artsakh. The Armavir battalion was supposed to enter via the Gospel and seize high ground, cutting off the enemy and encircling Sghnakh from both sides, forcing the enemy to retreat from Shushi.

In the village of Shosh, the commanders are explained about the operation, which would resolve the Shushi issue. On the night of November 5 at 2 AM, I was informed that the Armavir battalion refused; later, the two battalions from Armenia also refused to carry it out. It later turned out that while we were having that meeting, the head of the Martakert region was going to meet with those guys; let the investigation clarify what was discussed and why such a situation arose.

I was amazed by Jalal Harutyunyan's patience. Now they say, ‘Pashinyan could have stopped it…’ They stated directly—‘as a result, Shushi should be hot.’ Are you in agreement—‘no’? Well, if not, then we are fighting. Today it is represented differently. As far as I understand, after taking Shushi, they should have stopped.

About Lack of Weapons: 'Whatever Armenia Had, It Gave'
We had no air defense forces; we had six TORs, of which four were shot down. On the 2nd of the month, four more were delivered, which can cover an area of 40-45 kilometers, not more. But I said: the line became 470 kilometers. The air defense was nonexistent. Now they say there was weapons, Armenia didn’t provide them. I say: whatever Armenia had, it gave. All the fairy tales that we had weapons are false. We did not possess them. For understandable reasons, Russia was not obliged to give us weapons; we should have purchased them on time. No one was obliged, we should have had them. If we don’t have weapons, let’s not throw our people under the butcher’s churn; what should we do?