Pashinyan's Government Inherits Heavy and Complex Issues, Safaryan

The founder and director of the Armenian Institute of International and Security Affairs, political scientist Stepan Safaryan, has addressed the situation surrounding Amulsar on his Facebook page:

“The Amulsar issue is not only an environmental or public health issue but a consequence of a much larger and unresolved problem. I’m sorry to say this, but it highlights the lack of a vision for the country, specifically regarding the development path and the structure of the economy. Amulsar is indeed a consequence, just like many other issues we face and will continue to face…

We have not looked closely or learned how normal countries set serious targets for 5, 10, or even 20 years ahead, reaching those goals—whether it’s replacing gas dependency with renewable energy sources in Europe, reducing carbon emissions, or improving demographic conditions, among other matters. We have not done this, and we continue not to, without determining what percentage of our economy will be made up of mining, agriculture, or other industries in ten years.

Even if all risks associated with the exploitation of Amulsar were manageable, having a cyanide bath next to a wellness bath makes no sense; tourism is nonsensical, as is ecologically clean agriculture, and so on. Yes, Pashinyan's government has inherited heavy and complex problems, but that clear vision should have been presented during the elections. For example, that new polymetallic mining sites will not be exploited, or all mining standards not compliant will be strictly adhered to and shut down. Additionally, it should have been stated that mining volumes would be reduced by, say, 20 percent over the years, compensating for economic and other losses through these and those sectors.

There is much to write about what has not been done and has been discussed extensively—a clear vision and program is necessary. That is why we find ourselves in a state of situational decisions and evasions. That is why we are confronting the clash between expectations and reality, where public groups with different expectations during the revolution do not align with the reality being offered.

Over the past year, I have repeatedly spoken about the need for precise management of public expectations and hopes, ensuring that a portion of the population does not harbor delusions that all salaries and pensions will increase 100-fold the day after the revolution, that the country will suddenly become a paradise, and that all mining operations will close, leaving all workers to immediately become well-paid tour guides, IT specialists, and so forth.

This situation has arisen—the workers or those intending to work in the mines are worried about losing their jobs, while those wishing for the closure of risky mines are frustrated that they are not being closed. Moreover, I’m not even discussing external risks, which cannot be denied: the image of the country’s unpredictability and lack of attractiveness, and so on. Nor am I speaking of arbitration.

What I mean is, if there were a vision, and if a clear civil contract was signed between the electorate and the new authorities, this fragmentation would not exist. Not to mention the unclear frozen state observed in ‘My Step’—one is against it, another is for it, one is frightened and succumbs to the public opinion shaped by the competitor and does not shape that opinion as a political figure, while only their team leader is at the forefront, waiting silently in their office.

You cannot blame the public for wanting to live healthily. You cannot criticize honest people—environmentalists—seeking the government to think about other avenues for economic development, so that the disaster known as mining does not occur. You cannot blame the residents of Jermuk or Gndevaz for not wanting a mine next to them, especially when we, the residents of Tavush, rejected exploratory works for a new polymetallic mine in our mountains a year ago.

You can partially understand the government, knowing that if they close Amulsar, they will have to close all polymetallic mines the next day, as the risks associated with their exploitation are more visible. Failing to do so will make it impossible to explain to the outside world why they closed the safest mine while keeping another open, and why they displayed discriminatory approaches toward different foreign investors and companies.

The government cannot blame citizens when they question how ineffective state bodies and institutions can control the risks of a new mining project if they cannot effectively manage the situation in the existing mines. They cannot be blamed for contemplating investment risks, the country’s reputation, or the consequences of arbitration because that is their duty.

I say no one can blame the other, yet at this moment, everyone is blaming each other. Whoever speaks of arbitration is told, ‘Ah, they are scaring us!’ Whoever talks about the risks to investments is accused of exerting psychological pressures. Whoever advocates keeping all our mountains green is blamed for bringing back the romanticism of the early '90s—‘We’ll sell Jermuk and survive’—to the agenda.

In short, there are plenty of problems and questions arising from the fact that we continue not to solve the problems of the day, starting with not clearly defining the future, failing to reach a broad consensus on it, postponing the modernization and reform of state institutions, giving in to the political temptations of the moment, and failing to form a non-political team, among other issues. And it is evident that, in this situation, the solution and exit are not solely categorized as environmental, economic, political, or social.

To be honest, in this complex picture, I too would find it challenging to say where the solution lies. But one thing I can confidently state is that the public interest, which is not solely environmental, economic, or social, must prevail. And in my humble opinion, to find that point or platform for solutions, we need to revert to the homework that remains undone—what vision do we want to see for the state, the economy, and society in 5, 10, 20, 50, or 100 years… But what can I say? For the majority in Armenia, the present is better than the future, and short-term daily plans are certainly preferred over long-term ones. Hence, why think long-term and broadly when the present dictates to many…”